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ABSTRACT
We examine the bidding behavior of firms competing on ERCOT, the hourly electricity balancing
market in Texas. We characterize an equilibrium model of bidding into this uniform-price divisible-
good auction market. Using detailed firm-level data on bids and marginal costs of generation, we
find that firms with large stakes in the market performed close to theoretical benchmarks of static,
profit-maximizing  bidding  derived  from  our  model.  However,  several  smaller  firms  utilized
excessively steep bid schedules that deviated significantly from our theoretical benchmarks, in a
manner that could not be empirically accounted for by the presence of technological adjustment
costs, transmission constraints, or collusive behavior. Our results suggest that payoff scale matters
in firms' willingness and ability to participate in complex, strategic market environments. Finally,
although smaller firms moved closer to theoretical bidding benchmarks over time, their bidding
patterns  contributed  to  productive  inefficiency  in  this  newly  restructured  market,  along  with











Many recent empirical models of oligopoly competition, including the analysis of bidding in auction
markets, rely crucially on equilibrium assumptions.1 By assuming that ¯rms behave according to
a particular strategic equilibrium model, the researcher can map ¯rms' observed pricing or bidding
decisions into their unobserved costs of production or their valuations for the auctioned object. The
inferences drawn from such approaches rely heavily on the assumed strategic behavior. In most
instances, testing the validity of a particular equilibrium model is left to the laboratory, where the
researcher assigns costs/valuations to subjects and compares the subject behavior to the behavior
predicted by the equilibrium model of competition. Outside of the laboratory, it is di±cult to test
equilibrium models because data usually are not available on bidder costs/valuations.
In this paper, we analyze the recently restructured electricity market in Texas, where we have
the unique advantage of having very detailed data on ¯rms' bidding strategies and their costs of
producing electricity.2 Most of the electricity in this market is traded through bilateral forward
contracts between generators and users of electricity. To meet last-minute changes in aggregate
electricity demand that fall beyond or below contracted quantities, generation ¯rms submit bids to
adjust their production levels into an hourly \balancing market" administered by ERCOT (Elec-
tricity Reliability Council of Texas). Firms of various shapes and sizes participate in these auctions,
including large formerly regulated utilities, merchant generating ¯rms, and small municipal utilities
and power cooperatives. The auction mechanism is a multi-unit, uniform-price auction { ¯rms bid
supply functions and winning sellers earn the price at which aggregate supply bids equal demand.
We model competition in the hourly balancing market using Wilson's (1979) \share auction"
formulation.3 In our model, ¯rms choose bid functions to maximize expected pro¯ts under uncer-
tainty. Firms face two main sources of uncertainty. First, total demand for balancing power is
determined by events such as weather shocks, so it is stochastic from the perspective of the bidder.
Second, ¯rms possess private information on their forward contracts to supply power. These obli-
gations determine the ¯rms' net buy or net sell positions in the balancing market, and therefore
a®ect bidding incentives. Because they are private information, these contract obligations generate
uncertainty from the perspective of other bidders.4
1Klemperer (2003) and Einav (2004) clarify the connections between oligopoly competition models and auction
models.
2Our work is similar in spirit to papers that use \outside" estimates of marginal cost to measure price-cost margins
and test strategic oligopoly models. For example, Genesove and Mullin (1998) analyzes the sugar industry in early
20th century. Wolfram (1999) and Sweeting (2004) analyze the electricity market of England and Wales. Bajari
and Horta» csu (2003) use experimental data with assigned bidder valuations to gauge the performance of structural
econometric models of auctions.
3Ausubel and Cramton (2002), Wang and Zender (2000), Horta» csu (2002b), Viswanathan, Wang and Witelski
(2002) develop this theoretical framework further. See Cramton (2003) for a particularly accessible account of these
models.
4Our model is closely related to, but more general than Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) supply-function equilibrium
(SFE) model. The SFE has been in°uential in the modelling and analysis of electricity markets, as in Green and
Newberry (1990), Green (1992), Rudkevich (1999), Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2004), Crawford, Crespo and Tauchen
(2003). Sweeting (2004) uses data from the England and Wales market to test for static Nash equilibrium bidding
in a full information environment. Like the SFE, our model assumes that generation costs are common knowledge
2The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium characterization of bidding strategies on ERCOT's balancing
market yields three theoretical benchmarks of ¯rm behavior. The ¯rst theoretical benchmark is
\ex-post optimal" bidding, which is attained under a functional form restriction placed on Bayesian-
Nash bidding strategies, namely that an equilibrium supply function has to be additively separable
in its price and private information contract quantity components. Figure 1 explains the economics
of \ex-post optimal" bidding in ERCOT.5 Firm i's marginal cost curve is given by MCi(q), and
its forward contract position is labelled at QCi. Suppose ¯rm i is observed to submit the supply
schedule So
i (p;QCi) in the balancing market. The market clearing price in the balancing market,
and the actual amount of electricity that ¯rm i will be called upon to generate will be determined
by the intersection of So
i (p;QCi) and the residual demand (RD) curve faced by ¯rm i. The RD
curve is the sum of the supply schedules submitted by ¯rms other than i, subtracted from the total
demand for electricity in the market. The RD curve is uncertain from the perspective of ¯rm i
(since it depends on the realization of aggregate demand and the contract positions (QCis) of the
other bidders). Given a particular realization, RD1, and given its actual supply schedule, So
i (p),
¯rm i would supply the quantity at the price given at point D in the ¯gure. At this quantity, the
¯rm would supply more electricity than it was previously contracted to sell (D is to the right of A),
and its pro¯ts can be calculated as the pro¯ts from meeting its contract position, plus the pro¯t
made from providing additional power to the market.
However, ¯rm i could do better. For the residual demand curve RD1, ¯rm i could calculate the
marginal revenue curve given by MR1.6 By equating marginal revenue and marginal cost, the ¯rm
could then select point B, which maximizes its \ex-post" pro¯ts.
This, of course, is what would happen if ¯rm i knew that residual demand would be RD1.
What if the residual demand curve were instead RD2? Firm i could then calculate the marginal
revenue curve corresponding to this realization of residual demand, and ¯nd the \ex-post" pro¯t-
maximizing point C. Note also that the \ex-post" pro¯t maximizing point could be below marginal
cost given another realization of residual demand su±ciently to the left of RD2, so that the ¯rm
is called upon to generate less electricity than QCi. In this case, the ¯rm has to \purchase" power
from the spot market to cover its short position, i.e. it is in the position of a monopsonist so it
bids below marginal cost.
As is apparent from the ¯gure, ¯rm i's pro¯t maximization problem would be greatly simpli¯ed
if the set of ex-post pro¯t maximizing points (two elements of this set are points B and C) corre-
sponding to every realization of residual demand could be connected by a monotonic function such
across bidders, since a lot of engineering information is publicly available about each ¯rm's generation technology
and the spot price of fuel. However, the SFE does not allow bidders to possess private information, and takes only
aggregate demand uncertainty into account.
5This explanation is based on Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) construction of ex-post optimal supply function
equilibria. Their construction is also utilized in Wolak (2003b), especially in Figure 1 of his paper. Our conceptual
contribution here is to extend Klemperer and Meyer's intuition to the more complex context of the balancing market,
where private information about contracts, along with the aggregate uncertainty in total demand, requires the use of
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium formulation.
6The calculation of marginal revenue is net of the contract position, hence it crosses RD1 in the positive quadrant.
Further details are given in Section 3.
3as S
xpo
i (p). In that case, ¯rm i could submit S
xpo
i (p) as its supply schedule, and be guaranteed a
pro¯t-maximizing result under every possible realization of uncertainty.
In section 3, we show that restricting supply schedules to be \additively separable in private
information" allows one to characterize the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game in terms of ex-
post optimal supply schedules. The intuition under this result is that if supply strategies Si(p;QCi)
are additively separable in QCi, then so is the residual demand function for each ¯rm { i.e. any
shifts in residual demand are going to be parallel. This allows the set of ex-post optimal points to
lie on a monotonic supply schedule.
We acknowledge that additive separability is a rather strong a priori restriction to place on ¯rms'
strategies. However, it yields ex-post optimal bidding as a theoretical benchmark: given information
on marginal costs (MCi(q)) and the contract position of a ¯rm (QCi)7, it is computationally trivial
to ¯nd the ex-post optimal bid curve S
xpo
i by tracing the marginal revenue curves corresponding
to parallel shifts of the residual demand curve observed in our data. And, as we discuss in detail in
Section 4.2, this benchmark performs admirably well in explaining the behavior of the largest ¯rm
in this market. Figure 2 plots the \data-equivalent" of Figure 1 for Reliant Energy on June 4, 2002
when the ex-post optimal bid curve is very close to the actual bid curve. Note that this was not
the only day in which Reliant performed very close to the ex-post optimal bidding benchmark. We
show that Reliant's bidding strategy allows the ¯rm to capture 79% of its ex-post optimal pro¯ts
on the balancing market.
However, not all ¯rms perform as well as Reliant. In fact, as reported in Section 4.2, many do a
lot worse. This result might be driven by several factors, which are considered in the rest of paper.
The ¯rst possibility we consider is that the set of assumptions under which \ex-post optimal
bidding" is obtained may not be appropriate for this market. Therefore, in section 4.3, we provide
two methods to test whether observed bidding behavior is driven by \ex-ante" expected pro¯t
maximizing behavior.8 The ¯rst method is to compare the pro¯tability of actual bids to a bidding
strategy that conditions only on information that is \ex-ante" observable to the bidders. Our
alternative bidding strategy is to take the most recent realization of residual demand that bidders
observe before choosing their bids, and to ¯nd the optimal schedule for this realization.9 We ¯nd
that this \adaptive" strategy yields bid schedules that are very close to ex-post optimal, which
re°ects the fact that residual demand realizations are very persistent (up to a parallel shift) in the
data. Thus, not surprisingly, we ¯nd that this adaptive strategy can systematically outperform
all bidders in this market. The second method, described in section 4.3.2, is a GMM test of the
¯rst-order optimality conditions of the ex-ante pro¯t maximization problem.
All three theoretical benchmarks show that, aside from the largest sellers in this market, many of
the smaller ¯rms submit bid schedules that are excessively steep from the perspective of static pro¯t
7We discuss how we get this information in detail in Section 4.
8Bidding strategies that maximize \ex-ante" expected pro¯ts may not be ex-post optimal, in the sense that based
on the actual realization of residual demand, the ¯rm could have done better by bidding a point that is not on his
supply schedule. In other words, an \ex-ante" optimal bidding strategy is subject to regret, whereas an \ex-post"
optimal strategy is not.
9On ERCOT, ¯rms observed the recent history of aggregate bids with a 2 day lag.
4maximization. In Section 5.1, we examine whether technological adjustment costs may account for
the excessive steepness of bid functions, but do not ¯nd evidence con¯rming this hypothesis. In
section 5.2, we discuss whether transmission constraints may drive such bidding behavior. Although
we ¯nd evidence that (expected) transmission constraints may drive a portion of the excess markups,
it is unlikely to explain all of the deviations. Section 5.3 also discusses the possibility of collusion,
though we do not ¯nd this to be a likely factor.
As discussed in Section 5.5, one empirical pattern that appears very robustly in our data is that
the observed deviations from benchmarks are declining in the size of the ¯rm.10 This suggests the
presence of scale economies in setting up and maintaining a successful bidding operation { an intu-
ition con¯rmed by our interviews with traders in the market. It also suggests specialization. Indeed,
we ¯nd that some ¯rms specialize in bidding, while others outsource their bidding operations. In
Section 5.4, we provide more direct evidence for the heterogeneity in \sophistication" across bidders
{ which motivates why investments into bidding operations are important. In particular, ¯rms do
not make full use of the strategy space available to them. Each ¯rm can submit supply schedules
with up to 40 price-quantity points, but they use far fewer points. Moreover, our conversations with
some of the smaller traders revealed the frequent use of bidding heuristics echoing the sunk-cost
fallacy. Finally, we do ¯nd some evidence of learning over our sample period for the small ¯rms in
our sample. The learning rate is estimated to be 10% of performance improvement per year.
Whatever the sources of the observed behavioral deviations from the theoretical benchmarks,
they might be economically insigni¯cant if they do not lead to sizeable e±ciency losses. In Section 6,
we describe the two sources of e±ciency losses in ERCOT. The ¯rst is the e±ciency loss due to
the (optimal) exercise of market power by pro¯t maximizing ¯rms. The second is the e±ciency
loss due to the \excessive steepness" of small ¯rms' bid schedules that we can not reconcile with
expected pro¯t maximizing behavior. When we decompose the total e±ciency losses in this market
into these two components, we ¯nd, somewhat surprisingly, that the latter source of ine±ciency is
larger.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we describe the institutional
setting of the Texas electricity balancing market and present summary evidence that market prices
deviate from marginal cost pricing. In section 3, we model strategic bidding in this market as a
uniform price share auction. We discuss the empirical implications of our model. In section 4, we
compare our theoretical benchmarks with the actual bids in the data. Section 5 discusses these
results and explores possible explanations for deviations from ex-post optimal bidding. Section 6
calculates the welfare losses and section 7 concludes.
2 How Bidding Occurs in ERCOT's Balancing Energy Market
We analyze electricity transactions that occur through spot market auctions. In the Texas wholesale
electricity market, most trades occur via bilateral agreements. In addition to this bilateral market,
10Interestingly, \governance" based explanations that might predict municipal-owned utilities to perform worse
than investor-owned utilities appear not to be supported in the balancing market context.
5ERCOT, the system operator, conducts an auction to balance supply and demand in real-time.
Approximately 2-5% of energy is traded in this \spot market", called the Balancing Energy Services
auction, and we analyze the bidding into this auction.
The mechanics of electricity transactions on this market can be summarized as follows.11 One
day before production and consumption occurs, ERCOT accepts schedules of quantities of electricity
to inject and withdraw at speci¯c locations on the transmission grid. Those supply (\generation")
and demand (\load") schedules may di®er from the actual production and consumption in real-
time for a variety of reasons such as an unpredictably hot day or an outage at a powerplant. The
balancing market is a real-time market to balance actual load and generation. Depending upon
whether more or less power is needed than the day-ahead schedule, the balancing demand can be
positive or negative. As the time of production and consumption nears, ERCOT estimates how
much balancing energy is required. Because there are virtually no sources of demand that can
respond to prices in real-time, balancing demand is perfectly inelastic.
Bidders o®er to increase (\INC") and decrease (\DEC") the amount of power supplied relative
to their day-ahead schedule. Firms submit hourly INC and DEC bid schedules that must be
increasing monotonic functions with up to 40 \elbow" points (20 INC and 20 DEC bids). The bid
schedules apply to each of the four 15-minute intervals of the hour. Figure 3 displays a sample
bidder's interface for one participant's daily bids to DEC its generation.12 The bidder enters up
to 20 elbow points for each hour, and these bids may be changed up until one hour prior to the
operating hour. In addition, the bidder observes real-time information on its units' generation, the
load it is obligated to serve, and its net short or long position in the balancing market. A sample
of this operations interface is shown in Figure 4.
Procurement occurs using a uniform-price, multi-unit auction. ERCOT clears the balancing
market four times every hour by intersecting the hourly aggregate bid function with the 15-minute
perfectly inelastic demand function. A generator called to INC is paid the market clearing price
for all INC sales (i.e. production beyond the day-ahead schedule). Likewise, a generator called to
DEC pays the market clearing price for the quantity of output reduced. A generator that DECs
reduces output and purchases power from ERCOT at the market clearing price to satisfy existing
contract obligations.
Bidders appear to have a great deal of information on the competitive environment when they
choose their bid functions. Our conversations with several market participants suggest that traders
have good information on their rivals' marginal costs. The powerplants in Texas have very similar
production technologies, and there are publicly available data on the fuel e±ciency of each generat-
ing unit. Traders appear to know the major generating units that are on and o®-line at any point
in time. In addition, some market participants purchase real-time data on the generation of large
11See Wilson (2002) and Joskow (2000) for more detailed discussions of transactions in restructured electricity
markets.
12INC and DEC bids are submitted separately in this interface. We thank the real-time trading desk at Bryan
Texas Utilities for providing Figures 3 and 4 and allowing us to observe their bidding operations. We also thank
Reliant/TexasGenco for allowing us to visit and observe their trading desk and allowing us to interview their traders.
A variety of other market participants provided very helpful insights into trading in the balancing market.
6rival plants. An energy information company named Genscape has developed a technology that
measures real-time output with remote sensors installed near the transmission lines out of a plant.
Generators and traders can purchase subscription service to access the output data in real-time.
Figure 5 displays a sample Genscape interface.13 This can be useful strategic information not only
when initial bids are submitted but also if the trader wants to change the bids an hour before the
market clears.
This information may allow the trader to accurately estimate her residual demand in an up-
coming auction. The residual demand is the perfectly inelastic total balancing demand minus bids
by all other ¯rms. Total demand is stochastic, but shocks to total demand (e.g. weather) only
shift residual demand left and right in a parallel fashion. Rival bids can be inferred in two ways.
A trader equipped with knowledge of rivals' marginal costs and an equilibrium mapping of costs
to bids, will be able to calculate the aggregate bids of rival ¯rms. Alternatively, every trader has
access to aggregate bid data with a two day lag. By knowing the recent aggregate bid stack as well
as her own recent bids, the trader can infer the recent aggregate bids by all rivals. To the extent
that rival bids several days before are similar to current rival bids, the trader can infer the shape
of residual demand before placing their bids.
Congestion of the transmission grid poses a slight complication for our analysis. ERCOT is
geographically divided into several zones. If transmission lines between zones are not congested,
the balancing market is a single uni¯ed market across all Texas. However when lines become
congested, ERCOT divides the state into separate markets with di®erent market clearing prices.
During congested hours, bids by some ¯rms are technically feasible while bids by others are not.
Therefore, our analysis uses only uncongested hours and we treat all bids as technically feasible.
During our sample period, 74% of the time intervals are uncongested.14
We analyze weekdays from the beginning of the market in September 2001 to January 2003.
Although we can analyze any period of the day, we focus on 6:00-6:15pm because the most °exible
type of generators that can respond to balancing calls without large adjustment costs are likely
to be online during this peak hour of the day. The average number of megawatts (MW) traded
(both positive and negative) during this time interval is 915 MW.15 Figure 6 shows the probability
density of the (perfectly inelastic) demand for balancing energy. Demand for balancing power is
both negative and positive in many hours although is it close to zero on average.
The Texas market consists of a variety of investor-owned utilities, independent power producers,
13Also, the traders have interfaces with the ERCOT system that provide access to real-time charts of the grid's
electrical frequency. If a major unit goes o®-line, the frequency brie°y dips and indicates that an outage may have
occurred.
14Even with this sample restriction, there is another complication that ¯rms may have di®erent bidding strate-
gies during congested and uncongested hours, and that congestion is not perfectly predictable. We investigate the
possibility that ¯rms anticipate congestion in section 5.2.
15To compare this with other intervals, the average MW transacted across all intervals varies only slightly over the
day with an average volume of 890. Demand can vary substantially during the 15-minute intervals within a bidding
hour. The average di®erence between the minimum and maximum balancing demand is 617 MW for the 6:00-7:00pm
bidding hour. Because ¯rms can submit only one bid function for each hour, optimal bids must cover a wide range
of possible demand quantities.
7municipal utilities and power cooperatives. Table 1 breaks down the generation capacity by owner.
The two largest players are the two large former incumbent utilities: Reliant and TXU.16 The other
major investor-owned utilities are Central Power & Light and West Texas Utilities. Municipal
utilities (e.g. City of San Antonio Public Service and City of Austin) and power cooperatives (e.g.
Lower Colorado River Authority) also sell to the balancing market. Finally, a large number of
merchant generation ¯rms of various sizes participate in the wholesale market. The generation
technology is primarily natural gas and coal with small amounts of nuclear, hydroelectric and wind
generation.
Each ¯rm has some level of contract obligation to directly supply retail customers or provide
power to utilities that serve retail load. If the day-ahead generation schedule di®ers from the
contract obligation, the ¯rm is either long or short entering into the balancing market. This
residual contract position a®ects bidding incentives in the auction (Wolak, 2003a). We propose a
method to estimate the long or short position in section 3.
Table 2 shows the average sales into the balancing market auction for each 6:00-6:15pm time
interval by ¯rm. Reliant is by far the largest participant selling an average of 431 MWh. The other
large incumbent utility, TXU, averages substantially less relative to its capacity at 133 MWh. We
suggest below that this relatively low quantity of balancing sales results from an apparent reluctance
of TXU to supply \DEC" output to the balancing market, even when it appears pro¯table to do
so. The third and fourth largest sellers, Extex Laporte and Calpine, are merchant generators.
2.1 Is There Evidence of Any Market Power?
A precondition for testing strategic bidding is evidence of non-price-taking behavior. In this market,
strategic behavior can yield prices above marginal cost when balancing demand is positive and below
marginal cost when demand is negative. Interestingly, market power can lead to prices that are too
high or too low.17
Consider a ¯rm that has submitted a day-ahead schedule to generate its contract obligations and
therefore has no residual contract position in the balancing market. Firms that bid competitively
will bid up the marginal cost curve to increase output and down marginal cost to decrease output.
However if they exercise market power, the bid function will be steeper than the marginal cost
function.
If demand is positive, a ¯rm selling multiple units has incentives to markup the bid price above
marginal cost, sacri¯cing additional sales to raise the price earned on inframarginal units. This is
just the standard oligopoly result that a ¯rm acts as a monopolist on residual demand.
However, ¯rms will markdown bids below marginal costs if total balancing demand is negative.
The logic is very similar but in reverse. Suppose Firm A has contract obligations to serve its
customer 100 MW and has submitted a day-ahead schedule to generate 100 MW to cover that
contract position. Additionally suppose that total electricity demand (but not demand from Firm
16Reliant's powerplants were transferred to a subsidiary named Texas Genco.
17Kuhn and Machado (2004) also report this phenomenon in the Spanish electricity market.
8A's customers) is 10 MW lower than anticipated. ERCOT holds an auction to DEC generation by
10 MW and ¯rms bid a willingness to pay schedule to reduce generation. If it is called to reduce
generation by 10 MW, Firm A still must satisfy the 100 MW contract obligation so it pays the
balancing market price on the 10 MW short position. Firm A exercises market power by bidding
below marginal cost to sell itself into a short position but to lower the price at which it buys
back that position. Or, put di®erently, a ¯rm bids above marginal cost to exercise \monopoly
power" if it is a net seller, and bids below marginal cost to exercise \monopsony power" if it is
a net buyer. Therefore, positive price-cost margins in hours with positive balancing demand and
negative margins in hours with negative demand are consistent with the exercise of some form of
market power.
As a preliminary test, we calculate average prices during INC and DEC hours. For 6:00-6:15pm,
prices averaged $32.61/MWh during intervals of positive balancing demand and $21.24/MWh dur-
ing intervals of negative demand. In contrast, total ERCOT loads were not substantially di®erent
{ load averaged 37,968 MW during the positive demand intervals and 33,937 MW during the nega-
tive demand intervals. Given the technology mix of the ERCOT system, these price di®erences are
larger than the di®erence in system marginal costs for only about 4,000 MW additional production.
More formally, we measure price-cost margins for each ¯rm as the di®erence between the auction
price and the marginal cost of the generating unit that would be called upon to supply more or
less power. Across all ¯rms, margins average $4.70/MWh during INC intervals and -$6.37 during
DEC intervals.
The source of these margins and the e±ciency consequences are the subject of the remaining
sections of the paper. We model this strategic behavior, and test the predictions of this model
using observed bidding and marginal cost data.
3 An Equilibrium Model of Bidding on the ERCOT Balancing Market
We now provide a model of strategic behavior in this market that incorporates the uncertainty faced
by each ¯rm when making their bidding decisions. To do this, we follow the uniform price share
auction setup of Wilson (1979) to model competition in the balancing market. Speci¯cally, let us
index the costs of generation (at time t) of the N ¯rms in this market by fCit(q);i = 1;::;Ng. We
will take total demand ~ Dt(p) = Dt(p)+"t to be the sum of a deterministic price-elastic component
and a stochastic constant term. Prior to the balancing market auction, each ¯rm has signed ¯xed
price contracts to deliver certain quantities of power each hour, given by QCit. The analysis here
will assume that these contracts have been written a long enough time ago that they are taken
as \sunk" decisions from the purposes of a bidder making real time decisions on the balancing
market.18
18Although the analysis of the two-stage game with endogenous contract quantity choices adds a further and
interesting strategic dimension, we found that traders who negotiate forward contracts and traders who bid in the
balancing (real-time) market are distinct, and often belong to di®erent trading desks. Thus our model can be thought
of as applying to the real-time trader.
9In each time period t, each ¯rm simultaneously submits a supply schedule, Sit(p).19 In the
balancing market setup of ERCOT, Sit(p) can be thought of as the sum of a \day ahead schedule"
component, and a balancing schedule component. (Notice that the lumping of these two components
does not a®ect the strategic nature of the game if bidders are not provided any information about
each others actions until the market clears.) Given the supply schedules of each ¯rm, ERCOT
computes the market clearing price, pc
t, which satis¯es the below market clearing condition, in the




t;QCit) = ~ Dt(p) (1)
Each ¯rm gets paid Sit(pc
t)pc
t due to the uniform pricing rule. Hence, ¯rm i's ex-post pro¯t, upon







The ¯rm's payo® from its contract position is ¡(pc
t ¡ PCit)QCit, because it has to refund its
customers any di®erential between the contract and market prices for the contracted sales. Wolak
(2003a) has shown this is identical to a contract for di®erences.
Clearly, the most important source of uncertainty in the pro¯t equation above is pc
t, the market
clearing price at time t. In a strategic equilibrium, the uncertainty in pc
t, from the perspective of ¯rm
i, is due to two factors: the uncertainty in market demand, ~ Dt, and the unobserved components of
i's competitors' pro¯t maximization problems, i.e. the contract positions and prices of rival ¯rms,
f(QCjt;PCjt);j 2 ¡ig.
Following the discussion in Section 2, each ¯rm bidding into the market is assumed to know its
rivals' total cost functions. This knowledge would be su±cient to calculate equilibrium bids by rival
¯rms, except the ¯rm does not know its rivals' contract positions. Thus, following Wilson (1979),
we look for a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium characterization of the game, in which ¯rms' strategies
are of the form Sit(p;QCit).
To characterize a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, we de¯ne a probability measure over the realiza-
tions of the market clearing price, from the perspective of ¯rm i, conditional on ¯rm i's private
information contract quantity, QCit, and the fact that ¯rm i submits the supply schedule, ^ Sit(p),
while his competitors are playing their equilibrium bidding strategies, fSjt(p;QCjt);j 2 ¡ig:
Hit(p; ^ Sit(p);QCit) ´ Pr(pc
t · pjQCit; ^ Sit(p))
19von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) note that the existence of pure strategy equilibria can depend upon whether
bids are smooth or step functions for certain ranges of demand distributions. We follow the assumption in the
supply-function equilibrium literature and allow bids to be smooth.
10Utilizing the de¯nition of the market clearing price in equation (1), we can rewrite this probability
distribution as:
Hit(p; ^ Sit(p);QCit) = Pr(
N X
j²¡i







Sjt(p;QCjt) + ^ Sit(p) ¸ Dt(p) + "tgdF(QC¡it;"tjQCit)
where the ¯rst line follows from the fact that the event \pc
t · p" is equivalent to there be-
ing excess supply at price p. The second line, 1f:g is the indicator function for the enclosed
event, and F(QC¡it; ~ DtjQCit) denotes the joint distribution of the vector of contract quantities,
fQCjt;j 2 ¡ig, and the demand noise, "t, conditional on the contract position of bidder i, QCit.20
Now, rewrite the bidder's expected utility maximization problem, where U(¼) is the utility
enjoyed by the bidder from making ¼ dollars of pro¯t. This general utility formulation allows for








p^ Sit(p) ¡ Cit(^ Sit(p)) ¡ (p ¡ PCit)QCit
´
dHit(p; ^ Sit(p);QCit)
where the expectation is taken over all possible realizations of the market clearing price, weighted
by the probability density, dHit(p; ^ Sit(p);QCit). As shown in the Appendix B, Euler-Lagrange
necessary condition for the (pointwise) optimality of the supply schedule S¤


























it(p);QCit) is the \density" of market clearing price when ¯rm i bids S¤
it(p). HS(p;S¤
it(p);QCit)
can be intepreted as the \shift" in the probability distribution of the market clearing price, due to
a change in S¤
it(p), i.e. this is the term that captures the \market power" of ¯rm i. Notice that
this derivative is always positive, because an increase in supply lowers the market clearing price,
making the probability that the market clearing price is lower than a given price p higher.
Observe that the above ¯rst-order condition can be seen as a \markup" expression, where the
markup in price above the marginal cost depends on how much market power ¯rm i can exercise
by shifting the distribution of the market clearing price through its own supply function S¤
it(p).
20Observe that we have not imposed independence on this joint distribution; contract quantities and demand noise
can be correlated. However, as will be evident from the bidder's objective function below, this is not a common value
environment, as other bidders' contract quantities does not enter into the bidder's ex-post utility.
11As an intuitive consequence, observe that if HS ! 0, i.e. there is no market power, price equals
marginal cost. Also observe that where S¤
it(p) ¡ QCit = 0, p = C0
it(S¤
it(p)). This has an interesting
consequence for the empirical exercise to follow:
Proposition 1 If C0
it(S¤
it(p)) is observed, one can calculate the contract position QCit, by ¯nding
the quantity where the supply function of the ¯rm intersects its marginal cost function.
Observe also that:
Proposition 2 Marginal cost schedules C0
it(S¤
it(p)) are nonparametrically identi¯ed through knowl-
edge of contract quantities, QCit and Hit(p;S¤
it(p);QCit).
The empirical implementation of the above identi¯cation lemma requires the estimation of
Hit(p;S¤
it(p);QCit) (and its partial derivatives), for each bidder i, in every period t. This estimate
is the econometrician's estimate of the equilibrium belief of bidder i regarding the distribution of the
market clearing price in auction t, conditional on his bidding strategy, S¤
it(p). This might require
strong parametric assumptions regarding the speci¯cation of bidder-speci¯c beliefs, and especially
the role played by economic unobservables entering into bidders' beliefs across di®erent time peri-
ods.21 The latter concern is potentially the most troublesome: if bidders condition their beliefs on
factors unobservable to the economist, estimating Hit(p;S¤
it(p);QCit) by pooling data from a series
of auctions without taking these unobservable factors into account may lead to incorrect estimates.
Observe also that the set of ¯rst-order conditions (2) for each ¯rm, when written as a system
of equations, characterizes equilibrium strategies, Sit(pt;QCit) for given primitives of the game.22
The computation of equilibrium strategies is not a trivial task, however, since Hit(p;S¤
it(p);QCit)
is determined endogenously through the market-clearing condition (1), and depends on the joint
distribution of contract positions and the distribution of demand noise.
However, we now show that the characterization of equilibrium strategies in this game (2),
along with econometric inference regarding unknown marginal costs, is greatly simpli¯ed when the
functional form of the supply function strategies, Si(p;QCi) is restricted to a class of strategies
that are additively separable in the private information possessed by bidders:
Proposition 3 If supply function strategies Si(p;QCi) are restricted to the class of strategies:







i(p) is the price derivative of the ex-post
realization of the residual demand curve faced by bidder i.
Proof. See Appendix C.
21Some of these assumptions and possible estimation strategies based on such assumptions are discussed in the
discriminatory (pay-as-bid) share auction context by Horta» csu (2002).
22The primitives of this game are the set of ¯rms who are participating, N, their cost curves Cit(q);i = 1;::;N,
the joint distribution of contract quantities and the distribution of the uncertain demand component.
12The intuition underlying this result is tightly connected to the discussion in the introduction.
Observe that the additive separability restriction implies that, in equilibrium, the residual demand
function faced by bidders is also additively separable in its random component { i.e. all uncertainty
(from the perspective of bidder i) shifts the residual demand curve but does not rotate it. Given
this, it is easily seen that (subject to the concavity of the pro¯t function), the bid function Si(p)
provides a pointwise best-response to every possible realization of the residual demand curve. This
also means that the class of additively separable equilibrium strategies, when they exist, are ex-post
optimal, in the sense that seeing other bidders' supply functions would not change bidder i's choice
of supply function.23
As an important caveat, however, note that the additive separability restriction is an a priori
restriction on bidding strategies. It is not necessarily true that every speci¯cation of marginal cost
functions, C0
i(q) and joint distribution of contract quantities QCi, will lead to equilibrium strategies
of this form.24 However, Appendix D works through an example in which ¯rms possess linear
marginal cost curves (these can be asymmetric across ¯rms), under which equilibrium strategies
are analytically characterizable, and satisfy the additive separability restriction. Based on our
inspection of actual marginal cost curves, linearity appears to be a reasonable approximation.
This result has two immediate practical applications:
Proposition 4 Suppose supply function strategies Si(p;QCi) are restricted to the additively sepa-
rable class of strategies: Si(p;QCi) = ®i(p) + ¯i(QCi). Then:
1. Given data on the marginal cost function, one can compute the ex-post optimal supply curve
S
xpo
i (p), which is the ex-post best response to the observed realization of the residual demand
curve.
2. Equivalently, given QCi, one can compute the entire marginal cost curve rationalizing a supply
curve Si(p) observed in the data, using a single realization of the residual demand curve.
We start with part (1). Observe that under the above restriction, a single realization of the




realizations. Then, for a range of prices, p 2 [p
¹
; ¹ p], one can solve the equation for S, in terms of p
and QCi:






to trace out Sxpo(p;QCi), which constitutes an ex-post best-response to all possible realizations of
residual demand.
23The additive-separability restriction appears to be crucial. Note that without this linearity restriction, we can
not, in general, collapse the stochastic terms (from the perspective of bidder i) into a single scalar random variable.
See Appendix C for further discussion of the case where private information leads to rotations in residual demand,
as opposed to shifts.
24In particular, for certain speci¯cations of marginal costs, a bidder's best-response to additively-separable bidding
strategies by her opponents may not be additively separable.
13Part (2) follows using the same logic. This time we solve the equation:






for MCi, in terms of p, Si(p) and QCi. This yields MCi as a function of Si(p), which exactly traces
out the marginal cost function for all points on the support of Si(p).
Thus, although additive separability is a restrictive assumption, its imposition aids us greatly
in solving for optimal supply schedules. Perhaps more importantly, ex-post optimality aids us
in dealing with economic unobservables. Observe once again that the ex-post optimal supply
schedule corresponding to a given marginal cost schedule (or equivalently, the marginal cost schedule
rationalizing an observed bidding schedule) is derived using a single, ex-post observation of residual
demand. The proposed empirical procedure does not pool data across auctions, and thus avoids
the problem of making strong assumptions as to how to model the role of unobservables.
4 Analysis of Observed Bid Schedules
In our empirical application, we implement part (1) of Proposition 4. Speci¯cally, we use data on
the marginal cost functions of electricity generators to calculate the ex-post optimal supply curve,
which is also an equilibrium bid function under the restrictions imposed in Proposition 3. Then we
compare ex-post optimal bid schedules to actual bids.25
The calculation largely follows the discussion of Figure 1 in the Introduction. In order to
solve equation (3) for the ex-post optimal bid function, S
xpo
i (p;QCi), we require measures of QCi,
MCi(S), and RD
0
i(p). As we describe below, we collect data on each ¯rm's hourly marginal cost
function and bid schedule as well as information on the hourly realization of total balancing demand.
In order to measure the contract position, QCi, we use Proposition 1 which allows us to identify
the contract position under the assumption of equilibrium bidding. QCi is measured as the quantity
at which the actual bid schedule intersects the marginal cost function (point A in Figure 1). Note
that we also can identify the contract position under certain forms on suboptimal or non-equilibrium
bidding. This identi¯cation approach is valid as long as the ¯rm is su±ciently sophisticated to bid
above (below) marginal cost when it is a net seller (buyer), even if it errs in the size of the markup.26
Our conversations with various market participants lead us to believe that traders clearly recognize
the rationale for markuping up bids for quantities greater than the contract position (and vice
versa), but have di®erent heuristics for choosing the size of the markup.
Each ¯rm's residual demand RDi(p) is the realized total demand minus the bids by all rival
¯rms. Suppose RD1 in Figure 1 is the actual realization of residual demand for ¯rm i. We
25Because only balancing sales in ERCOT are sold through the auction, we have to modify the notation of the
model in ¯t our application. Demand ~ Dt is now de¯ned as total ERCOT demand minus the total quantity scheduled
day-ahead. MCit is now the marginal cost of changing output from the ¯rm's day-ahead schedule. And QCit is now
the amount that the ¯rm is long or short on its contracted sales after the day-ahead schedule and upon entering the
balancing market.







1(p) and ¯nd the ex-post optimal (price, quantity) bid to be Point B, where the
marginal revenue curve corresponding to RD1(p), MR1, intersects the marginal cost curve MC.
Also, we can calculate the ex-post optimal bid under other possible realizations of uncertainty (i.e.
other realizations of total balancing demand, ", and rivals' private information, QC¡i). Because
each form of uncertainty acts to shift residual demand in a parallel fashion, we can consider another
possible realization of residual demand as RD2 { the realized residual demand shifted parallel to
the left. Under this realization of uncertainty, the optimal bidpoint is given by Point C, where
MR2 = MCi(q). We repeat this operation by adding parallel shifts to the actual realization of
the residual demand curve to ¯nd the set of ex-post optimal points for various realizations of
uncertainty. The ex-post optimal bid function is traced out by the set of ex-post optimal bid points
to generate S
xpo
i (p;QCi). It is important to note that our assumption that the slope of residual
demand is independent of uncertainty is necessary for the set of ex-post optimal points to be on a
monotonic bid function.
We should also note that since the residual demand function is a step function whose derivatives
are either zero or in¯nity, we follow Wolak (2003a) to obtain a \smoothed" version of the residual
demand function to calculate the marginal revenue curve.27
4.1 Data
We use data on hourly balancing demand and ¯rm-level bids and marginal costs. To construct
each ¯rm's marginal cost function, we utilize data on the generating units operating on a given
hour and the hourly declared capacity of each unit. The marginal cost of operating units represents
the variable costs { fuel, operating and maintenance, and SO2 permit costs { of coal and natural
gas ¯red units. A growing body of literature has developed on measuring the marginal cost of
electricity production (for example, see Wolfram[1999], Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak [2002],
Mansur [2002], Puller [2004], Joskow and Kahn [2002], Bushnell and Saravia [2002]) and we use
the same approach. Details of the data and additional institutional considerations are discussed in
Appendix A.
Our \marginal cost of balancing power" function is the costs of providing more power (INCing)
or the cost savings of reducing production (DECing) from the day-ahead scheduled quantity. We
construct this function by ¯rst calculating the total marginal cost function of producing in a given
hour, and then subtracting the quantity that has already been schedule one-day ahead. Total
marginal cost is the marginal production cost of units that are reported by ERCOT to be operating
and available in period t. It is reasonable to assume that ¯rms produce in a least cost manner, so we
stack up the marginal cost of each generating unit from cheapest to most expensive and construct
the total marginal cost function.28 We have data on how much generation has been scheduled
27Let f(p1;q1)::::;(pK;qK)g represent the price and incremental quantities that form the residual demand curve




h ) where K(:) is a kernel function.








h ) We used a normal kernel
and the smoothing parameter, h = 10MW throughout our analysis.
28Our conversations with several traders in the market suggest that they spend signi¯cant resources coming
15day-ahead by the ¯rm. Thus the marginal cost of supplying balancing power is characterized as
the total marginal cost function with the origin re-centered at the day-ahead schedule. Certain
types of generating units that cannot supply power on short notice are then excluded from this
marginal cost stack. Natural gas-¯red units, and to a lesser extent coal units, can be adjusted on
relatively short notice to other production levels. Other types of units such as nuclear, wind, and
hydroelectric typically cannot respond to balancing market calls. Therefore, we exclude nuclear,
wind, and hydroelectric generating units from the marginal cost portfolio for providing balancing
energy.29 For a sample marginal cost function, see Figure 2 where Reliant has the capacity to
increase production by 900 megawatts (MW) at a cost up to about $40, and decrease production
by over 3000 MW at a cost savings between $30 and $35.
We use ¯rm (portfolio) bid schedules for each ¯rm for the 6:00-7:00pm hour of each non-
congested weekday.30 To determine the sales into the balancing market, we intersect the actual bid
with the realization of residual demand to determine sales. We assume a step function which is a
good approximation to the actual dispatch algorithm used. This simulation of the actual auction
predicts prices with only a 5% error.
4.2 Comparison of Actual Bids to Ex-Post Optimal Bids
Figure 7 displays representative actual and ex post optimal bid functions for three large suppliers
{ Reliant, TXU, and Calpine { and for one small seller, Guadalupe. In each panel, competitive
bidding is o®ering the \MC curve" and optimal bidding is o®ering the \Ex-post optimal bid." The
intersection of the actual bids and marginal cost schedules is the contract position. For quantities
above (below) the contract position, the ex-post optimal bid function is above (below) marginal cost.
Visually, Reliant's bids appear much closer to the optimal bids than to the marginal cost function.
In addition, Reliant's performance for incremental supply (Balancing MW > 0) is relatively similar
to its performance for decremental supply.
TXU is close to the ex-post optimal bid function on the INC side, but bids below ex-post
optimal prices on the DEC side. We see this tendency for TXU to o®er DECs at only very low
prices throughout our sample period.
Calpine o®ers some DEC bids but does not o®er to INC supply. Although Calpine does o®er
INC bids in some periods, much of Calpine's bids are to DEC supply. Those DEC o®ers are often
are at prices substantially below ex post optimal bids.
up with the \least cost" arrangement. For example, a specialized computer program called PCI GenTrader
(www.powercosts.com) is utilized by some traders to compute the least cost dispatch arrangement.
29Some hydroelectric units may be able to respond to balancing calls, however these units represent less than 1%
of total capacity and are primarily owned by Lower Colorado River Authority.
30A few ¯rms submit their bids through other ¯rms which makes it impossible to separate the bids by ¯rm. We
address this complication by using all bids when constructing residual demand curves, but only interpreting the bids
as \¯rm-level behavior" if the bidder primarily submits bids for a single ¯rm. If a single generation owner supplies
at least 90% of the total generation supplied by the bidder, we de¯ne that bidder as a ¯rm. This partially limits our
ability to analyze behavior over parts of our sample. For example, the largest supplier of balancing power, Reliant,
cannot be separated from City of San Antonio Public Service in 2001, so we cannot analyze Reliant's behavior until
2002.
16Guadalupe submits bids that are much steeper than ex-post optimal. Because it is a small
seller, Guadalupe's residual demand function is relatively °at as compared to the residual demand
of the larger players. Nevertheless, small sellers have some potential to bid strategically and exercise
market power. However, the actual bid functions are signi¯cantly above the optimal bids in INC
periods and below optimal bids in DEC periods. This suggests that bids signi¯cantly di®erent
from marginal cost are not intended as a means to exercise market power, but rather to avoid
being called upon to change production from day-ahead schedules. Many small sellers show similar
bidding patterns. We will discuss several reasons underlying these patterns in Section 5.
Finally, note that the ¯rms use coarse-grained strategies that utilize a small number of bidpoints.
All three bidders use far fewer bidpoints than the maximum permitted, and it appears that using
more bidpoints would allow the ¯rms to better ¯t the relatively smooth optimal bid function. This
observation is discussed in detail in Section 5.4.
The visual inspection of the ¯gures are suggestive of the closeness of actual bidding behavior
to ex-post optimal behavior, but a more meaningful metric to evaluate bidders' performance is to
measure how much pro¯t they have foregone ex-post by deviating from the ex-post optimal bidding
schedule.
To calculate the pro¯t deviation, we calculate the di®erence of the producer surplus obtained
at the actual submitted price/quantity point (point D in ¯gure 1), and the surplus obtained at the
ex-post optimal point (point B in ¯gure 1). We calculate this di®erence each ¯rm-period for 20
simulations of residual demand which we construct by adding uniformly distributed noise to the
actual demand. These simulations allow us to evaluate the optimality of several points on the bid
function that would be the market clearing price under possible realizations of residual demand.
The results are generally robust to the scale of the noise added.
We also calculate the producer surplus achieved relative to a benchmark of \suboptimal" be-
havior to compare how much distance is closed between the benchmark of suboptimal pricing and
optimal pricing.31 One possible benchmark is behaving non-strategically and bidding marginal cost.
However, it appears that the \default" behavior is to bid to avoid being called to supply balancing
power. As shown in the sample ¯gures, smaller ¯rms choose to bid only small quantities relative
to both competitive and optimal bidding. Therefore, we measure performance as the fraction of
(dollar) distance between \no bidding" and ex post optimal bidding that is realized by the actual
bids. Producer surplus is:
¼ = PBAL(QBAL
i ) ¡ TC(QBAL
i ) ¡ (PBAL ¡ PC)QC
We calculate ¼ for three scenarios: (1) ex post optimal bidding, (2) actual bidding, and (3) bidding
to avoid the balancing market (i.e. not bidding at all and buying/selling at the market clearing
price any net short or long position on contracts). Our primary measure of performance is:
31We cannot use a measure such as the fraction of possible pro¯ts achieved because some ¯rms tend to be short on
their contract positions entering the balancing market, and we would have to make an assumption about the contract




which we calculate for each ¯rm in the market.
One should keep in mind that PercentAchieved is only a metric of the generator's performance
in the balancing market. It does not account for the pro¯tability of the vast majority of output
that is sold through bilateral transactions, and therefore may understate the overall pro¯tability of
electricity sales. In order to measure the pro¯ts of bilateral sales we would require data on contract
prices, but such data are not available. However, we can construct an upper bound for overall
pro¯tability by assuming that each generator is maximizing pro¯ts in the bilateral market but may
be sacri¯cing pro¯ts in the smaller balancing market:
UpperBoundTotalPercentProfitability = PercentAchieved ¤ %SalesinBalancing
+100% ¤ %SalesinBilaterals
4.2.1 Ex-post Pro¯tability
Table 3 compares output and producer surplus in the balancing market under actual and ex-
post optimal bidding. Potential pro¯ts relative to not bidding are shown in column 5. For the
largest ¯rms with average sales of at least 250 MWh under ex-post optimal bidding, the potential
pro¯ts average about $2300/hour for each 6:00-6:15pm interval, with Reliant having the most
\money on the table" of $4,333 each hour. Firms that would sell less than 250 MWh under ex-post
optimal bidding would average about $750/hour in potential pro¯ts ranging from $2,176/hour for
Air Liquide America to $31/hour for Denton Municipal Electric.
The ¯rst column displays the percent of potential pro¯ts achieved under the actual bid schedules.
Reliant achieves 79% of ex-post optimal pro¯ts, or $3,422/hour of the $4,333/hour of potential
pro¯ts. The next two ¯rms closest to ex-post optimal pro¯ts are two relatively small municipal
utilities { Brownsville (50%) and Bryan (45%). TXU, the second largest incumbent utility, achieves
39% of potential pro¯ts while the largest independent power producers, Tenaska Gateway and
Calpine, achieve 41% and 37%, respectively. The two other major incumbent utilties { West Texas
Utilities and Central Power and Light { capture only 8% of potential ex-post pro¯ts. The other large
municipal utilities earn a moderate fraction of potential pro¯ts: Austin (30%) and San Antonio
(23%). The largest electricity cooperatives earn lower pro¯ts: LCRA (25%), Brazos (15%), and
South Texas (3%).32
Several characteristics of bid schedules appear to drive the foregone ex-post pro¯ts. We exam-
32Note that two ¯rms, Extex Laporte and Air Liquide, earn lower pro¯ts under actual bidding than bidding to
\avoid the market." Both ¯rms, which are infrequent participants in the balancing market, have positive contract
positions and relatively high cost units available. Both bid so they are called to INC despite the fact that it would be
more pro¯table to not participate and buy its contract position from the market at a price lower than marginal cost.
18ined many sets of actual and ex-post optimal bid functions similar to Figure 7. The key charac-
teristic of underperforming bidders is that the actual bid functions tend to be \too steep" relative
to optimal bids. By bidding too high during INC hours and too low during DEC hours, ¯rms sell
less in the balancing market than under ex-post optimal bidding and forego individually pro¯table
sales. As shown in columns 6 and 7 of Table 3, ¯rms sell less than the ex-post optimal quantity on
average. Interestingly, the cause of foregone pro¯ts is not that ¯rms are bidding more competitively
than individually optimal, but rather that bid prices are too high. Also, ¯rms use coarse-grained
strategies that utilize far fewer bidpoints than the maximum permitted, as we discuss in more detail
below.
It is important to keep in mind that these pro¯tability measures do not necessarily represent
generator's overall performance in trading electricity. Many generators may focus their strategic
e®orts in the bilateral market where the vast majority of transactions occur.33 If ¯rms focus
strategic e®orts on the bilateral markets, the overal performance is substantially higher. The upper
bound on total pro¯tability, shown in column 8 of Table 3, ranges from 41% to 98% with a mean
of 80%. These metrics are more likely to re°ect the ¯rms' overall performance.
4.3 Tests of \Ex-Ante" Expected Pro¯t Maximization
It is important to note that the calculation of foregone pro¯ts in the previous section relies on
restrictions that we place on the economic environment. In particular, we assume that bidders'
equilibrium perceptions of the uncertainty regarding residual demand results in \parallel shifts"
rather than \pivots" in residual demand. If this assumption is violated, it is possible that the
set of ex-post optimal price-quantity points is a \cloud" of points that cannot be connected by a
monotonic supply function. If this were the case, a pro¯t-maximizing ¯rm's solution to the (ex ante)
expected pro¯t maximization problem may not be the set of ex-post optimal price-quantity points.
That is, testing whether ¯rms maximize \ex-post" pro¯ts as we did would not be informative
about whether ¯rms maximize \ex-ante" pro¯ts. Since \ex-ante" pro¯tability is a more accurate
measure of bidder performance in the presence of more general sources of uncertainty, we employ
two additional testing strategies.
4.3.1 Best-Response to Previous Rival Bids
First, we test if ¯rms could signi¯cantly increase pro¯ts by using a simple bidding rule that utilizes
only information available to traders at the time of bidding. The bidding rule we will employ is a
naive best response to recent rival bidding. As discussed in section 2, traders have access to the
aggregate bid function with a two day lag. Using their own bids from the past, traders can calculate
the aggregate bids by rivals in the recent past. To construct the naive best response of ¯rm i for
upcoming day t, we:
33Although we have no formal evidence, it appears that the skill set of traders who negotiate bilateral trades is
di®erent from that of traders who sell through electronic auctions.
191. Use aggregate bids and own bids for day t¡3 and calculate aggregate rival bids on day t¡3
2. Assume rivals use the t ¡ 3 bid schedule on upcoming day t
3. Calculate ex-post optimal bid function for various realizations of day t total balancing demand
Note that this algorithm uses only information available to ¯rms when bids are submitted. We
view this bidding rule as fairly unsophisticated { it uses only a small fraction of the information
available to traders and it would be simple to program as an add-in to the trading interface used by
the generators. We calculate producer surplus under \naive best response" bidding and compare
to producer surplus under actual bidding. If uncertainty causes the expected pro¯t maximizing bid
to di®er from ex-post optimal bids, the actual pro¯tability should be much closer to the naive best
response benchmark.
Results are shown in column 4 of Table 3. Across all ¯rms, naive best response pro¯ts are
substantially higher than actual pro¯ts and very close to ex-post optimal pro¯ts. The performance
of actual bidding is signi¯cantly below the naive best reply benchmark for all ¯rms except Reliant.
In fact, most bidders' performance measure of \Percent Achieved" rises very little when compared
against the naive best reply benchmark. Moreover, naive best response pro¯ts are very close to
ex-post optimal pro¯ts { the former average $1,193 and the latter average $1,204. This suggests
that our ¯ndings of \money left on the table" do not arise from the restrictions placed on the
economic environment.
4.3.2 Moments-Based Test for Expected Pro¯t Maximization
A second test for expected pro¯t maximization uses a GMM based approach inspired by Wolak
(2003a). Under the null of expected pro¯t maximization, each bid price and quantity is chosen
optimally so that incremental changes in either the price or quantity should not increase pro¯ts on
average. For example, if a ¯rm uses 3 bidpoints, then the e®ect of increasing the price and holding
the quantity constant (or vice versa) of any of the three bidpoints should not locally increase pro¯ts
on average across the sample.
Assume a ¯rm bids k bidpoints each period and each point is given by (pk;qk). Let the bid
function be given by ­ ´ (p1;q1;:::;pk;qk). Suppose any uncertainty in residual demand is de-
termined by a random variable º, and we do not restrict the relationship between º and residual
demand (i.e. it need not be additive). Let pro¯ts be given by:
¦(­;º) = RD(p(º;­);º) ¢ p(º;­) ¡ C(S(p(º;­);­)) ¡ (p(º;­) ¡ PC)QC
The ¯rst-order conditions under expected pro¯t maximization with respect to each price and quan-












20Wolak derives sample analogs to the ¯rst-order conditions and shows how the moments can be used










































The ¯rst part of each moment is \marginal revenue minus marginal cost" at the market-clearing
price multiplied by the marginal e®ect of changing the price/quantity on the market-clearing price.
The second part is the e®ect on production costs of changing the price/quantity and being called
upon to change output.
Wolak (2003a) uses the above price moments to estimate the marginal costs that (in expectation)
rationalize observed bids using GMM methodology. In our context, we know (or assume we know)
the marginal costs for each period, hence we only need to evaluate the above ¯rst-order conditions.
For each ¯rm, this yields a vector of residuals for each period, ut;t = 1;::;T. Under the null
hypothesis of expected pro¯t maximizing behavior, the moments evaluated at the actual bidding






















where ST = 1
T
PT
t=1 [(ut ¡ ¹ u)(ut ¡ ¹ u)0] is the sample covariance matrix of the residuals.34 Hansen
(1982) shows, within the context of GMM estimation, that TJT » Â2
p¡k, where p is the number of
moments, and k is the number of parameters. In our application, there are no unknown parameters,
so we set k = 0.
In our calculations of the J-statistic for the ¯rms in our sample, we found that the test using
quantity moments had much higher power than tests using price moments. One intuition for this is
the following. Consider a hypothetical ¯rm that does not maximize expected pro¯ts. Suppose the
¯rm could pro¯tably participate in the balancing market, but chooses not to participate except in
the rare instance when the INC price is very high. The ¯rm bids to produce zero output unless price
is $100 in which case it INCs 1 MW. Under almost all possible realizations of residual demand, the
market clearing price is lower than $100 so the ¯rm is not called upon to INC. Although this ¯rm is
not maximizing expected pro¯ts, the price moments are essentially zero because the bid price is far
enough away from typical market clearing prices that a small increase in the bid price is unlikely
to a®ect the market clearing price (
@p
@pk jpk=100 ¼ 0) and increasing the bid price slightly above $100
is unlikely to a®ect the quantity sold ( @S
@pk jpk=100 ¼ 0). Thus, tests using price moments could
easily fail to reject the null of expected pro¯t maximization for this hypothetical (non-expected
34Inspection of the residual autocorrelation function did not yield signi¯cant temporal dependence. Accordingly,
we found that the Newey-West estimator for the covariance matrix did not yield di®erent J values.
21pro¯t-maximizing) ¯rm.35
However, quantity moment tests are likely to be higher power for ¯rms that submit very steep
bid functions as is the case for many ¯rms in ERCOT with large bid-ask spreads. The quantity
moment test asks whether our hypothetical ¯rm could marginally increase pro¯ts by bidding some
positive quantity at all prices up to $100. Moments for the hypothetical ¯rm are likely to be
non-zero for two reasons { bidding to INC positive quantities at low prices is likely to increase the
quantity called ( @S
@qk > 0) and the increased quantity bids will decrease the overall market clearing
price (
@p
@qk < 0) at prices where marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost. Our choice of quantity
over price moments stems from the fact that ¯rms with large bid-ask spreads (e.g. Guadalupe) are
more likely making \quantity mistakes" than \price mistakes".
Table 4 reports the results of our statistical test of expected pro¯t maximization using quantity
moments. We report the results for the top 6 performers in Table 3, who realized more than 35%
of their ex-post pro¯ts. To perform this test, we evaluated the quantity derivative on 11 equally
spaced price points between 16 dollars and 36 dollars (the interquartile range of spot prices). The
magnitudes of the J-statistic roughly follow the ordering in Table 3. However, none of these top 6
¯rms except Reliant and Brownsville are close to passing the test of expected pro¯t maximization
(the 5% critical value of the Â2 distribution with 11 degrees of freedom is 19:7). Reliant only passes
this test if we exclude sample observations after November 2002. This cuto® point in time is not
spurious { when we inspected Reliant's performance in terms of achieving its ex-post pro¯ts, we
found a marked drop o® starting November 2002 (Reliant achieves 84% of ex-post pro¯ts on average
until the end of October 2002, but achieves only 31% of ex-post pro¯ts subsequently). Although we
do not know the exact cause for the dip in Reliant's performance, one of our interviewees indicated
that there was an organizational change in the bidding operations of Reliant when a new subsidiary
began to bid for some of Reliant's generating units.
These results indicate that, except for Reliant, ¯rms in this market violate the ¯rst-order opti-
mality conditions that need to hold (on average) for expected pro¯t maximization. This is broadly
in agreement with our ex-post pro¯tability measures and the \naive best-response" benchmark,
and suggests that ¯rm behavior in this market displays consistent departures from static, unilat-
eral pro¯t maximization.
5 Explaining Deviations from Optimal Bidding
This section investigates several explanations for the observed deviations from static pro¯t maxi-
mization and the considerable heterogeneity across ¯rms in terms of performance.36 In particular,
we consider the possibility that the observed deviations are driven by unmeasured costs of produc-
tion. We then consider whether expectations regarding transmission congestion may drive some
of the deviations from the optimal benchmarks. We also assess whether a dynamic pricing game
35One could view the moments as only local tests of optimality.
36Note that explanations based on risk-preferences are ruled out by the fact that the ¯rst-order condition of
optimality (equation(2)) does not depend at all on the curvature of the bidder's utility function.
22may explain these patterns. Finally, we explore whether the observed deviations are driven by
characteristics of the ¯rms such as the ¯rm size, the ¯rm type (e.g. investor-owned utility vs.
municipal utility), and the generation technology. We ¯nd that the most signi¯cant determinant
of performance is the size of the stakes that each ¯rm has in the balancing market.
5.1 Adjustment Costs
We consider the possibility that there are costs of supplying balancing power that we fail to measure.
A ¯rst observation is that even if our measures of marginal costs are biased up to a level shift, this
bias would not a®ect our ¯nding regarding the slope of observed bidding schedules { i.e. the fact
they are too steep. However, we also could be erring in measuring the slope of the marginal cost
curves. Recall that our measure of marginal cost is the marginal fuel and operating/maintenance
cost of a generator that is constantly operating; we do not explicitly measure the cost of adjusting
the level of output from the day-ahead schedule.
If ¯rms faced large adjustment costs, we would expect to see large steps in the bid schedules at
a balancing quantity of zero.37 We ¯nd that many ¯rms forego pro¯ts because their bid functions
have a large range of prices at which quantity o®ered is zero. To a varying degree, we see such
phenomena in bids. For example, in Figure 7, Guadalupe is not o®ering to supply additional INC
energy until the price reaches $33 nor o®ering to reduce production until price is $11 despite the
fact that one of its units that can both INC and DEC has marginal cost of $28. We call this
di®erence in prices the \bid-ask spread."
Although some ¯rms' bids are consistent with the presence of adjustment costs, there is only
weak evidence that real adjustment costs exist. One source of these adjustment costs might be the
\transaction cost" associated with the actual implementation of a balancing market adjustment
in their generation { i.e. the cost of coordinating and communicating with the engineering sta®
to adjust production levels on short notice. However, our interviews suggest that most ¯rms in
ERCOT have invested into software and hardware that electronically receives the balancing call
from ERCOT and adjusts the physical output from the generators. Adjustment costs could also
arise if certain generating technologies are less °exible in adjusting output from the day-ahead
schedule. In particular, coal-burning generators tend to be less °exible than natural gas-¯red units.
In order to test this explanation, we identify the fuel type of the marginal production unit for each
¯rm-interval for those ¯rms that serve as their own bidders. For all ¯rms with the exception of
one, a gas-¯red unit is marginal in at least 70% of the time periods with several ¯rms having gas
units on the margin over 90% of the time.38 In addition, the periods when there are no gas units
available to INC or DEC are uncorrelated with lower percentages of pro¯ts achieved. Therefore,
37Another means ¯rms can utilize to indicate adjustment costs is the ramprates submitted with the bid schedule.
The ramprates indicate the maximum rate at which a given generating unit can increase or decrease production. If
the quantity a ¯rm would be called under the bids violated a ramprate, the unit would be skipped over in favor of the
next unit in the bidstack. When this occurs, the balancing price reported by ERCOT would di®er from the price we
calculate using the bid stack. However, as we discuss above, the two prices are very close for the periods we analyze.
38The ¯rm that does not frequently have a gas unit on the margin is South Texas Electricity Cooperative. We do
not explore the possibility that some gas-¯red technologies are more °exible than others.
23we do not believe that the limited °exibility of coal units is causing us to understate the marginal
cost and bias upwards our measure of foregone pro¯ts.
Although we cannot rule out the possibility that some unmeasured engineering adjustment costs
may exist, it appears unlikely that those costs explain the large variation in bid-ask spreads which
we observe across ¯rms with similar generation technologies. Table 5 displays the average bid-ask
spread in column 3. Reliant averages a relatively small spread ($2.06) suggesting relatively smooth
bid functions as depicted in Figure 2. The other generators' bids have bid-ask spreads averaging
approximately $20-$30. If there were engineering adjustment costs, one would expect the costs to
a®ect the bids of all ¯rms with similar technologies.
Furthermore, bid-ask spreads tend to decrease over time for those ¯rms that achieve the greatest
fraction of ex-post optimal pro¯ts. This is seen in Table 8 in which we analyze the time trend in a
regression setting. We regress the ¯rm's daily bid-ask spread on a time trend and a dummy variable
for the o®-peak season when ¯rms tend to have fewer units operating. The top six ¯rms exhibit
statistically smaller bid-ask spreads over time. In contrast, the remaining ¯rms do not exhibit a
signi¯cant downward trend.
There are two possible explanations for these observed trends. Perhaps some ¯rms found means
to reduce adjustment costs and those ¯rms were able to earn higher pro¯ts in the balancing market.
Such an explanation would be surprising because the production technology is fairly uniform. A
more plausible explanation is that any adjustment costs are more \perceived" than real and that
the best performing ¯rms recognize the potential pro¯ts from participating in the balancing market,
a possibility we will discuss in more detail in section 5.5.
5.2 Transmission Constraints
Another economic factor that may a®ect our analysis of static pro¯t maximization are transmission
constraints. Transmission constraints pose two complications for our analysis. First, when trans-
mission lines between zones reach capacity, the market is divided into separate zones with di®erent
market clearing prices. To address this complication, our sample includes only the 74% of time
intervals with no zonal transmission congestion when the entire ERCOT market is integrated into
a single market.
Second, even if we restrict our sample to ex post uncongested hours, the ex ante possibility
of congestion may a®ect the expected pro¯t-maximizing bid function. Consider a generator in a
zone that could be import constrained with positive probability. If the transmission line were to
be congested, the generator would face no competition from outside the zone after the line reaches
capacity. However, if the line were not congested, the generator faces competition from the entire
state. This uncertainty introduces the possibility of kinks and convexities in the residual demand
function that change the pro¯t-maximization problem. If ¯rms cannot perfectly forecast congestion
before submitting their bid schedules, the expected pro¯t-maximizing bid during intervals that are
ex-post uncongested re°ect the optimal bid if there were congestion. Therefore, the strategic e®ect
of congestion may spillover to the uncongested hours we analyze.
24We do not ¯nd evidence that the deviations from ex-post optimal bidding in uncongested
intervals are signi¯cantly caused by uncertainty regarding the state of congestion. We test whether
our metric of pro¯tability is systematically related to the frequency of congestion. If the bidding
strategy under congestion spills over to uncongested periods, the ex-post pro¯tability should be
lower in months with more frequent congestion. We regress the monthly measure of pro¯tability,
PercentAchieved, on the percent of 6:00-7:00pm intervals with transmission congestion. We also
control for the percent of intervals when balancing demand is negative, ¯rm ¯xed e®ects, and the
quantity of sales under optimal bidding. Results are shown in Table 6 for all ¯rms and for only
those ¯rms that act as their own bidders. After controlling for ¯rm e®ects, we ¯nd that a high
prevalence of congestion reduces pro¯tability, but the e®ect is not signi¯cant for own bidders and
only marginally signi¯cant for all ¯rms. The coe±cient of the congestion variable is very similar
and robust to other (unreported) speci¯cations. Despite the lack of statistical signi¯cance, we
can assess the e®ect of congestion using the point estimates. It does not suggest the e®ect of
congestion is large. A one standard deviation increase in the monthly percent of congested hours
reduces PercentAchieved by 3.0%. Even moving from the month with the smallest to the largest
frequency of congestion only reduces pro¯tability by 9.4%. These reductions do not account for the
measures of PercentAchieved substantially below 100%. Therefore, it does not appear that the
possibility of congestion accounts for a signi¯cant fraction of the foregone ex-post pro¯ts measured
in section 4.
5.3 Collusion
Another possibility is that the excessive steepness of observed bids (compared to unilateral ex-post
optimal bids) results from collusion. However, the patterns of inelastic bids in ERCOT make an
explanation based on dynamic pricing problematic.
First, many of the ¯rms that sacri¯ce unilateral pro¯ts by submitting bid schedules that are
\too steep" do so by including large bid-ask spreads around their contract quantity. Consistently
large bid-ask spreads are not consistent with collusion. Large bid-ask spreads result in zero sales
whereas dynamic pricing would result in sales that are smaller than ex-post optimal levels but are
still positive. In particular, it is di±cult to rationalize the behavior of the ¯rms in the bottom half
of Table 3 by resorting to windfalls from collusion.
Moreover, the bids most consistent with dynamic pricing are those of small, fringe ¯rms rather
than the large players. Potential candidates for dynamic pricing are those that bid above unilateral
ex post optimal prices for quantities above their contract position and below optimal prices for
quantities below their contract position. In general, the ¯rms that ¯t this description are smaller
¯rms that submit very inelastic bid schedules. The larger ¯rms bid closer to ex-post optimal.
Although we have not performed a systematic analysis of potential coalitions, we believe it unlikely
that a collusive coalition would form that included the small but not large players.39
39Another explanation o®ered by the literature to explain observed deviations from static pro¯t maximization is
the presence of regulatory threat, as suggested by Wolfram (1999). The Texas balancing market was in its infancy
255.4 Bounded Rationality?
Yet another possibility is that observed deviations from static pro¯t maximization are caused
by boundedly rational behavior. Such an explanation is not a priori implausible. Bidders have
indicated to us that this market is subject to a lot of uncertainty, in which complex decisions
have to be made in short amounts of time, and that bidding decisions are often made based on
heuristics. This conjecture also is consistent with Peter Cramton's observations from advising
electricity bidders. Cramton (2004) notes that some electricity bidders explicitly compute residual
demand functions while others use much more ad hoc, experimental approaches.
We now discuss two pieces of evidence that are suggestive of boundedly rational behavior in
this market, particularly by the smaller bidders. The small ¯rms do not appear to select bids based
upon sophisticated analyses of their strategic environment and, as a result, sacri¯ce pro¯ts in the
balancing market. In section 5.5, we claim that this apparent sacri¯ce of pro¯ts by small ¯rms may
be rational, given the large ¯xed costs of establishing a sophisticated bidding operation.
5.4.1 Coarse-grained Bidding strategies
The bid rules for the ERCOT balancing market allow each bidder 40 price-quantity points in each
geographic zone (20 points for each zone's inc and dec bid stacks). This a®ords generators a large
degree of °exibility in bidding, especially those ¯rms that own generation in more than one zone.
However, none of the bidders in our sample make full use of the 40 price-quantity points that
they can use to trace out their optimal bidding functions. Table 5 shows the average number of
bidpoints used by all ¯rms that serve as their own bidder. The ¯rm earning the greatest fraction of
ex-post pro¯ts (Reliant) also uses the largest number of bidpoints, averaging 22.2 elbow points per
bid schedule. None of the other ¯rms use more than 13 points on average. Although pro¯tability
is not strictly rising in average bidpoints, the two measures of bidding sophistication are positively
correlated. Apparently, traders choose not to formulate re¯ned bid strategies with desired quantities
for many potential realizations of the market clearing price. This is consistent with anecdotal
evidence in which one market participant said that traders would try to bid above marginal cost,
and the choice of the number of bidpoints depended upon \how detailed you wanted to be."
5.4.2 \Sunk cost" heuristics?
There is some evidence that smaller ¯rms base their bidding decisions on heuristics. One heuristic
that would work well for the small ¯rms in this market is to recognize that they have very little
market power, and to bid a small markup above their marginal cost. However, our data suggests
at the same time the revelations about suspicious trading strategies by ¯rms such as Enron put many energy trading
¯rm in the cross hairs of regulators. Production strategies such as unilateral pro¯t-maximization that are legal in
most industries in the U.S. were questioned as illegal and unethical in the electricity industry. Energy ¯rms were in
limbo as to the rules of the game and \how far they could go" to maximize pro¯ts. However, it is noteworthy that
the observed bidding behavior is not consistent with ¯rms that fear \going too far". To the contrary, bid functions
were steeper than unilateral market power levels { prices were too high on the INC side and too low on the DEC
side. If anything, ¯rms were \too greedy" rather than \too competitive".
26that these small bidders are doing exactly the opposite by bidding too high. Our interviews of
several small players with low performance metrics yielded several interesting explanations for this.
For example, several bidders who own newer generating units that are ¯nanced under debt claimed
that they add an additional markup to cover debt. Although they acknowledged this is essentially
a fallacy of sunk costs, company o±cials claimed this nevertheless is done. One ¯rm said that it
sets high prices during uncongested intervals in order to \make up for losses" during periods of
congestion when compensation under special market rules is allegedly low. We ¯nd that those high
prices often priced the ¯rm out of the market and lowered pro¯ts. Finally, some smaller players
o®ered an explanation for not participating in the market even if the ¯rm had additional capacity.
Some players claim to keep extra capacity available so they are not caught short if another one of
their units were to su®er an outage. Economic logic suggests it is optimal to bid extra capacity
into the balancing market regardless of whether another unit unexpectedly goes o²ine. If another
generating unit does not have an outage, the ¯rm loses the opportunity of selling the extra capacity
to the balancing market. If another unit does go o²ine, there is no di®erence between selling extra
capacity to the market and buying it back at the market price, i.e. `selling the capacity to oneself'
at an opportunity cost of the market price.
5.5 Participation Costs and Scale Economies in Bidder Performance
We now consider the hypothesis that small ¯rms might not have su±ciently large dollar stakes to
justify the ¯xed cost of participating in the balancing market. To do this, we ¯rst have to clarify
what we mean by \participation." Throughout sections 4 and 5, we have documented that small
¯rms submit bid schedules with large bid-ask spreads that e®ectively price them out of the market
for plausible realizations of residual demand (in fact, as Table 3 shows, some ¯rms at the bottom of
this table are almost always priced out of the market). As noted in Section 5.1, these large bid-ask
spreads can be rationalized by an \adjustment cost" that prevents these small ¯rms from supplying
power to the balancing market. However, as discussed in that section, we fail to ¯nd evidence for
purely technological sources of such \adjustment costs."
An alternative interpretation of these large bid-ask spreads is that it does not pay for the small
¯rms to bid the optimal markup over their marginal cost, even if this optimal markup would allow
them to pro¯t from incrementing/decrementing their power generation, or \participating" in the
balancing market much more often. This interpretation is plausible if it is costly for these ¯rms to
calculate the optimal markup conditional on participating. As a result, ¯rms may ¯nd it pro¯table
to devote substantial strategic resources to the bilateral but not to the balancing market.
Indeed, there is evidence that performing optimal markup calculations on a real-time basis is
costly.40 Through ¯eld trips and phone calls, we have observed that ¯rms with large stakes in
the balancing market have invested substantial amounts of money in energy trading hardware and
40Note that although expected pro¯t maximization predicts that small ¯rms should bid close to marginal cost
due to their lack of market power, an easy enough decision to make, these ¯rms would not want to bid too close to
marginal cost, either. Such a strategy would also yield low pro¯ts, especially when the ¯rm's marginal cost schedule
is essentially °at, as is the case for small ¯rms with a single generation plant.
27software, and hire experienced energy traders. Those ¯rms that do not invest the ¯xed cost to
establish a trading operation may simply bring over personnel from other operations who do not
have energy trading experience. The ¯xed and variable costs of running a trading operation are
likely not to be trivial. One market participant suggested that even a simple bidding operation
would require an upfront expenditure of $3 million with annual operating costs of $1 million, and
that most sophisticated trading operations could be much more expensive. The magnitude of these
costs is not trivial compared to the \money-left-on-table" ¯gures reported in Table 3.41
Another component of this \¯xed cost of participation" is institutional. ERCOT only allows
certi¯ed companies, called \quali¯ed scheduling entities"(QSEs) to submit bids in the balancing
market.42 All other ¯rms have to route their bids through a QSE, or contract with a QSE to
conduct their bidding operations. This suggests that only ¯rms with greater dollar stakes may ¯nd
it optimal to incur the ¯xed costs of becoming a QSE.
Even conditional on paying the ¯xed cost of becoming a QSE, scale economies still appear to
matter. This is clearly seen in Figure 8, which displays the relationship between bidding perfor-
mance and size for generation ¯rms who conduct their own bidding { i.e. the ¯rms who act as
their own QSE. Our measure of performance is the percent of ex-post optimal pro¯ts, calculated
in the manner described in section 4.2. Our measure of stakes in the balancing market is the
volume of sales under ex-post optimal bidding (using other size measures, such as actual volume
of sales, or ¯rms' total capacity, yield similar patterns). There is a positive relationship between
\Percent Achieved" and optimal sales volume. The ¯gure includes the ¯tted linear relationship
which is positive and marginally signi¯cant when all ¯rms are included. When Bryan is excluded,
the relationship is even stronger and highly signi¯cant.
One literature that has looked at departures from pro¯t-maximization is the literature on cor-
porate governance.43 One might, for example, expect municipal utilities to behave very di®erently
from investor-owned utilities, or merchant power generators. A quick look at Figure 8, where we
have labeled whether a ¯rm is a municipal or investor owned utility (only Calpine is a merchant in
this ¯gure) appears to reveal a weak constrast; though, it is di±cult to disentangle this outside of
a multiple regression framework { which is what we do next.
We now examine the extent to which stakes are correlated with performance for the broader
sample of ¯rms in a regression context, along with other ¯rm-speci¯c factors that we believe might
a®ect performance. We regress each ¯rm's measure of \Percent Achieved" on a measure of stakes
in the balancing market { the volume of sales under ex-post optimal bidding (SIZE). Also included
are ¯rm-level covariates on ¯rm type (independent power producer, municipal utility, and investor-
owned utility) and whether the ¯rm acts as its own bidder (OWNBIDDER). Finally, we include
dummy variables for whether the ¯rm's generation technology is at least 50% comprised of two
41An annual expenditure of $1 million corresponds to $114 per hour for one year of operations (365 days, 24 hours),
without correcting for the fact that the hour we are analyzing is a peak hour.
42The reasoning behind this restriction is to guarantee that a bidder will be able to back up its \bid" with physical
delivery of power.
43See, for example, Demsetz and Lehn [1985].
28technologies that are less °exible to quick changes in output (COAL and COMBINED-CYCLE).
Results are reported in Table 7. The baseline regression in column 1 yields a result that is
consistent with the \scale hypothesis:" a 1000 MWh increase in sales is associated with a 52
percentage point increase in \Percent Achieved".
Column 2 suggests that a \corporate governance" based explanation is not borne in the data.
Controlling for size and technology, the performance of municipal utilities in the balancing market
appears, in fact, to be slightly (2.5 to 4.8%) better than that of investor-owned utilities, though
the regression coe±cient is not statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels. Moreover, merchant
¯rms actually seem to be doing the worst.
We also ¯nd that the technology mix of a ¯rm does not appear to a®ect its performance on
the balancing market. In column 3 we add measures of technology type and, ¯nd that owning
a large fraction of coal and combined-cycle generation units in fact does not negatively impact
performance. This result reinforces our argument in Section 5.1.
We can best measure scale e®ects if we focus on those ¯rms that choose to establish their own
bidding operation rather than those that outsource. In column 4, we control for whether the ¯rm
performs its own bidding and allow the e®ect of SIZE to vary by OWNBIDDER status. Larger
stakes are associated with higher performance for ¯rms that serve as their own bidders. For ¯rms
that perform their own bidding, a 1000 MWh increase in optimal sales volume is associated with
an 86 percentage point increase in Percent Achieved.
Moreover, if one were to view the choice to serve as their own bidder as a revealed preference,
then the threshold volume of sales where it becomes pro¯table to construct an in-house bidding
operation rather than to outsource is 71 MWh (=-(-.071/.001)). The results are similar when we
control for ¯rm type and technology (column 5). A 1000 MWh increase in optimal sales volume
is associated with an 97 percentage point increase in Percent Achieved and the threshold size for
ownbidding is 163 MWh.
Our interviews with traders support this positive correlation between stake-size and bidder
performance conditional on participation. Larger ¯rms hired many experienced energy traders
and purchased software to retrieve and visualize the vast array of operational, bid, and weather
data that is available in real-time. At least one ¯rm developed in-house software to retrieve and
analyze data from ERCOT and formulate bids in real-time. Many of the large ¯rms also purchase
the Genscape data on real-time production. In contrast, ¯rms with smaller stakes typically do not
have the same hardware and software assets, and rather than hiring experienced traders, they bring
in personnel from their generation and transmission divisions. Our interviews also revealed that
there is a °uid market for electricity traders { successful traders at small ¯rms are hired away by
larger ¯rms. Finally, Bryan's large \Percent Achieved" despite relatively small size deserves special
note. Bryan claims to have invested heavily in a trading operation in order to become a bidder to
which other small ¯rms will outsource their bidding responsibilities.
295.6 Learning
One might also expect bidders to gradually learn the rules of competition in this market, and
gradually improve their bidding behavior over time. Indeed, the downward trend in bid-ask spreads
that we document in Section 5.1 can be interpreted as a sign of learning to participate in this market.
To explore this hypothesis further, we now examine whether there are any time trends in bidder
performance.
Table 9 reports the results of a regression of individual bidder's daily performance (measured by
the percentage of ex-post pro¯t achieved for that day) on a time trend and controls for seasonality
and the bidder's ex-post optimal generation in that period. The speci¯cation includes bidder ¯xed-
e®ects to account for ¯rm-level sources of variation. Notice that, for the entire sample of ¯rms, the
estimated coe±cient for the time trend is positive, and indicates a 3 percentage point improvement
in performance for every 100 days (or roughly 10% over a year). It is interesting to note that this
time trend is not signi¯cant (though of the same estimated magnitude) for the top six bidders. For
the rest of the ¯rms, the time trend in performance is strongly signi¯cant.
Thus, our data appears to support a learning hypothesis; though the rate of learning in this
market strikes us as being rather slow (especially compared to rates of learning reported in lab-
oratory experiments).44 However, we should note that ¯rms in this market face a considerable
amount of uncertainty, which may slow bidders' ability to infer optimal decision rules from their
experiences. Moreover, several bidders have told us that they do not have the resources to perform
detailed \ex-post" analyses that will enable them to assess how successful their bidding has been,
and that they view our exercise as providing useful information in this regard.
6 Quantifying E±ciency Losses
Ine±ciencies arise in electricity markets when the bids do not lead to least-cost production.45 In
a balancing market, ¯rms bidding above marginal cost on the INC side may not be called upon
to produce despite the fact they have low cost generators. Similarly, ¯rms bidding below marginal
cost on the DEC side may not be called to reduce production even if they have high cost plants
operating.
We can measure the cost of production in the balancing market implied by actual bids and
compare those costs to the production costs under various counterfactual bidding behaviors. Our
benchmark for e±ciency is competitive bidding, which is an equilibrium under an alternative market
design { the multi-unit Vickrey auction. The multi-unit Vickrey auction can result in higher prices
but pays ¯rms information rents to reveal their true cost. We calculate the production costs if
44It is di±cult to make a direct comparison between \rounds" in the laboratory and \days" in electricity markets.
However, if we are willing to equate \rounds" with \days," bidding behavior appears to converge (in percentage pro¯t
terms) to theoretical predictions quicker in many laboratory experiments. See Kagel (1995), Section F for examples
from auction experiments.
45Because total demand is perfectly inelastic, prices higher or lower than competitive levels do not cause suboptimal
levels of consumption. All ine±ciencies are productive rather than allocative. For a more general discussion of the
e±ciency properties of uniform price multi-unit auctions, see Ausubel and Cramton (2002).
30¯rms instead were to bid their marginal cost functions. These calculations su®er from one data
limitation. The generation data are incomplete for a few of the smaller ¯rms. This does not a®ect
our ability to analyze bidding behavior for the remaining ¯rms but does prevent us from calculating
e±cient dispatch for many days in our sample. Therefore, these measures of e±ciency loss should
be interpreted with caution for they only represent a fraction of our sample period.
Results are shown in Table 10. The average hourly dispatch costs in the balancing market
are $29,874 under actual bidding and $23,571 under marginal cost bidding, implying that actual
production costs are 27% higher than least cost production.
We can decompose the welfare losses into the two major sources of ine±ciency. The ¯rst source
of ine±ciency is the strategic exercise of market power { large ¯rms face steeper residual demand
functions and thus have incentives to bid steeper than marginal cost. This may result in ine±cient
production when low cost units are withheld from the market while higher cost units are called to
generate.46
The second ine±ciency is somewhat less standard. As we have noted, many of the smaller
participants submit extremely steep bid functions { even though static pro¯t maximization suggests
that they should bid very close to marginal cost. As a result, they are often not called to produce
despite the fact that it would be e±cient to do so. This source of ine±cient production can arise
from a variety of sources as we discuss above (e.g. ¯xed cost of establishing a sophisticated trading
operation).
To decompose the total amount of production ine±ciency into these two components, we sepa-
rate the ¯rms into two groups: \strategic" bidders who exercise market power optimally, and\non-
strategic" bidders who bid exceedingly steep schedules that e®ectively minimizes their participation
in the market. We ¯rst compute counterfactual generation costs in this market under the assump-
tion that \strategic" ¯rms ignore their market power and bid competitively, i.e. we calculate what
the total generation cost would have been if the \strategic" ¯rms were bidding their marginal costs.
In this counterfactual, we assume that the \non-strategic" ¯rms continue to bid what they are ob-
served to bid, i.e. that they do not respond to the (counterfactual) change in the behavior of their
strategic competitors.47
We assume that the three largest ¯rms { Reliant, TXU, and Calpine { as well as the other 3 ¯rms
in the top 6 in Table 3 (Brownsville, Bryan and Tenaska) are \strategic." We ¯nd counterfactual
dispatch costs when these six ¯rms bid marginal cost and all other ¯rms submit their actual bid
schedules. The di®erence in dispatch costs between this counterfactual bidding strategy and the
actual bids can be interpreted as the \e±ciency loss due to market power." The remaining e±ciency
46Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) ¯nd the actual production costs to be 14% higher than competitive levels
in the California market in 2000 due to market power. Mansur (2004b) re¯nes the methodology from Borenstein,
Bushnell and Wolak to correct for production constraints such as start-up costs, and ¯nds that actual production
costs in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland market exceed competitive costs by 3%. Note that our analysis
only calculates productive ine±ciencies in the balancing market for units that have already started and submitted
day-ahead schedules.
47Note that the \reverse" of this counterfactual, where we set \non-strategic" bids equal to marginal cost, and do
not allow \strategic" bidders to respond, would be less realistic, since our results show that the \strategic" bidders
do respond to changes in the residual demand they are facing.
31loss is due to non-strategic ¯rms that bid so as to not participate in the market.
Table 10 decomposes the e±ciency losses. Again, the total e±ciency loss due to misrepresenta-
tion of marginal costs is on average $6,303 per hour, or 27% of the total cost of e±cient generation
in the balancing market. If the \strategic" ¯rms were to bid their marginal costs, the total e±ciency
loss would have been only $1203 less than the actual e±ciency loss. This means that most (81%)
of the observed e±ciency loss is due to the steep bid schedules submitted by the \non-strategic"
bidders.
We should note, once again, that the above calculation relies on relatively few intervals (62 out
of a total of 220 periods { the latter periods are especially prone to the missing data problem).
This calculation is largely based upon the ¯rst six months of the market's operation. However, this
calculation points out that the observed deviations from static pro¯t maximization are not without
economic consequence. In fact, in terms e±ciency, they cause larger e±ciency losses due to the
\near-optimal" exercise of market power by the \strategic" ¯rms. Submitting bid functions that
are too steep not only sacri¯ces producer surplus, but also prevents technologically e±cient ¯rms
from supplying energy to the balancing market.
One would expect that these e±ciency losses due to the \non-strategic" ¯rms' behavior would
dissipate over time. Unfortunately, as we noted above, we face data limitations that prevent us
from conducting a long time series analysis, especially in the later part of the sample. However,
market forces are at play to reduce the ine±ciencies. To the extent there are scale e®ects, the
small ¯rms may outsource bidding decisions or consolidate bidding activities across plants. It is
noteworthy that there are a variety of power marketers and large energy trading ¯rms that o®er
energy asset management services to generators in ERCOT. It will be interesting to see if more
¯rms outsource bidding in the future, and whether this increases the e±ciency of production in
this marketplace.
7 Conclusion
Our analysis of the ERCOT balancing market yields a comforting conclusion for economic theory. In
a marketplace that is marked by considerable uncertainty and institutional complexity, two factors
that may pose analytical challenges for both the ¯rms competing in the market and the economists
who are observing them, ¯rms with large stakes in the market behave close to theoretical predictions
of a strategic model of oligopolistic interaction. Indeed, as two empirical industrial organization
researchers who have previously utilized such models to infer supply and demand parameters in
other markets, we were swayed to interpret the behavioral pattern displayed by Reliant as good news
for empirical analyses of oligopolistic markets. More speci¯cally, con¯rming the basic predictions of
the uniform price share auction model is important, as one could use this model to forecast bidder
behavior in restructured electricity markets that are being put into operation in many di®erent
parts of the world.
However, our results also suggest some amount of caution when analyzing and predicting the
32behavior of smaller players in newly restructured/deregulated markets. Smaller ¯rms submit bids
that di®er substantially from the benchmarks we construct for optimal bidding. This ¯nding is not
inconsistent with rational economic behavior by these bidders, however. As argued in Section 5.5,
\participation" in the balancing market may have nontrivial costs, and the behavioral pattern
across ¯rms appears to con¯rm this hypothesis.
The fact that participation costs may a®ect small ¯rms' behavior is not without consequence in
this market. In Section 6, we calculated the small ¯rms' bidding patterns led to nontrivial losses in
productive e±ciency. This suggests interesting new avenues for market design that explicitly takes
into account the strategic complexity, hence the participation costs imposed by proposed market
mechanisms. Such a consideration would favor dominant strategy implementable mechanisms, such
as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, over others. However, as pointed out by Milgrom
[2004] (chapter 2.5), the VCG mechanism su®ers from serious pitfalls of its own. Nevertheless, we
view theoretical research in this area to prove extremely fruitful for real-world applications.
33APPENDIX A: CONSTRUCTION OF BID AND COST DATA
In this appendix, we describe the data on bids and total balancing demand, as well as how
we construct the hourly marginal cost function of each ¯rm. Bids into the balancing market are
available for each hour of the sample. The bids are not unit-speci¯c but rather are the aggregate
bids for all units for which the bidder, or quali¯ed scheduling entity (QSE), bids. The actual
deployment is based on other factors as well. ERCOT takes the QSE portfolio deployments and
allocates the incremental and decremental generation among the generating units based upon a
speci¯c algorithm which considers factors such as the rate at which units can ramp up generation
and the location of units within a zone. In the event that units are allocated to solve intrazonal
congestion, the generators also receive unit-speci¯c premia payments. However, we restrict our
sample to periods when these factors are unlikely to substantially alter the deployment that would
be implied by the bids and least cost dispatch. (We analyze hours without interzonal congestion
for a non-shoulder period). The bids implied by the bid stack alone predict the actual prices with
only 5% error, so we believe the bid stack is a good model of actual deployment, or at least the
bidder intent.
QSEs occasionally bid for more than one ¯rm. For example, in the South zone in 2001, the
QSE named Reliant bid for both Reliant and the City of San Antonio Public Service Company. We
match the bid functions to all units for which the QSE bids. So for all units owned by both Reliant
and the City of San Antonio in the South in 2001, we match the bid function to the generation data.
This allows us to plot the bid function on top of the marginal cost of supplying into the balancing
market. However, interpretation of the results becomes problematic when an observed bid function
represents the bids by more than one ¯rm. Because the results are some combination of two ¯rms'
behavior, we will not interpret results in such situations. We only interpret our results as ¯rm-level
behavior when at least 90% of all electricity generated by owners using that QSE can be attributed
to a single owner. We make one exception to this 90% rule. TXU Generation comprises 87% of the
generation for TXU the QSE in North 2002. Because TXU is such a major player, we nevertheless
refer to this as TXU the generation company.
We measure the variable costs of output using data on each unit's fuel costs and the rate at
which the unit converts the fuel to electricity. Only certain units are su±ciently °exible to supply
power on short notice. We assume that nuclear, wind, and hydroelectric units cannot supply to the
balancing market. In addition, we assume that only units that are currently operating can supply
into the balancing market. Data on the availability of generating units are from ERCOT. For each
15-minute interval, we have data on whether a generating unit is operating, and its hourly available
generating capacity. The ERCOT system is largely separated from other electricity grids in the
country so there are virtually no imports into ERCOT.
We measure the marginal cost of units that burn natural gas and coal. For each unit, we
have data on the fuel e±ciency (i.e. average heat rate). Each unit is assumed to have constant
marginal cost up to its hourly operating capacity. This assumption, which is common in the
literature, assumes that average heat rates are good approximations of incremental heat rates
34for the relatively small changes in output implied by balancing sales. This assumption is most
problematic for combined-cycle gas turbines at lower levels of utilization.
Daily gas spot prices measure the opportunity cost of fuel for natural gas units. We use prices
at the Agua Dulce, Katy, Waha, and Carthage hubs for units in the South, Houston, West, and
North zones, respectively. We assume a gas distribution charge of $0.10/mmBtu. Coal prices are
monthly weighted average spot price of purchases of bituminous, sub-Bituminous, and lignite in
Texas, reported in Form FERC-423 by the Energy Information Administration.
Coal-¯red plants in Texas are required to possess federal emission permits under the Clean Air
Act Amendments for each ton of SO2 emissions. Therefore, we require a measure of the emission
permit cost for each MWh of electricity production. In order to measure average emission rates,
we merge hourly net metered generation data from ERCOT with hourly emission data from EPA's
Continuous Emission Monitoring System to calculate each unit's average pounds of SO2 emissions
per net MWh of electricity output. The emissions each hour are priced at the monthly average
EPA permit price reported on the EPA website (this price is the average of Cantor-Fitzgerald and
Fieldston prices).
In order to deal with complications posed by transmission congestion, we restrict our sample
to daily intervals 6:00-6:15pm during which there is no interzonal transmission congestion during
the 6-7pm bidding hour. We believe intrazonal (or local) congestion is also likely to be rare during
the intervals.
We do not account for the sales of operating reserves. In electricity markets, the grid operator
procures the right to purchase power from generating units that are to be operating with excess
capacity available to provide power on short notice. We do not incorporate the possibility that
some of the available capacity to INC in our data may be sold as reserves. However, the amount
of operating reserves procured are small as a fraction of total demand.
We measure the marginal cost of INCing or DECing from the day-ahead schedule of output. We
account for the fact that units cannot DEC down to zero output without incuring costs of startup
and facing constraints on minimum downtime. It is unlikely that revenue from the balancing
market would be su±ciently lucrative to compensate a unit for shutting down. Rather, ¯rms are
likely to supply balancing energy services along the operational levels of currently operating units.
Therefore, we assume that each operating unit cannot DEC to a level below 20% of its maximum
generating capacity. Therefore, each ¯rm's marginal cost function is essentially the portfolio's
marginal cost for the upper 80% of its units' maximum generating capacity.
35APPENDIX B: Derivation of the ¯rst-order condition of optimality
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Now label the integrand:
F(p;S;S0) = ¡U
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Equating and cancelling terms, we get:
HSU0(:)(S ¡ QC) = HpU0(:)(p ¡ C0)
or





36APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Given the additively separable form of the bidding strategies Si(p;QCi) = ®i(p)+¯i(QCi), use the
market clearing condition (1) above to represent the event fpc
t · pjQCi;Sig , i.e. there is excess
supply at p, conditional on ¯rm i bidding Si at this price:
X
j6=i




The left hand side of this inequality can be labeled as a (bidder-speci¯c) random variable, µi, that
does not depend on p, and the right hand side is a deterministic function of price. Let ¡i(:) denote















































Evaluating the derivatives gives
Hp(p;Si;QCi)




j(p)]. Now, observe that with
the above restrictions, the residual demand function faced by ¯rm i (for a given realization of the
random variables f";QC¡i;i = 1;::Ng), is given by:















which yields the result in the proposition.
Note that in one other case where we can collapse the multiple stochastic terms into a scalar
random variable, we do not obtain the ex-post optimality result. This is the case when Si(p;QCi) =
®i(p) + ¯ipQCi and ~ D(p) = D(p) + p", i.e. private information and aggregate uncertainty leads
to pure rotations of the residual demand curve. In this case market clearing condition becomes
37µi =
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j6=i ¯jQCj ¡ " ¸ 1
p
h










38APPENDIX D: An Analytically Solvable Example for Ex-Post Optimal Equilibrium
Assume a symmetric setup with N > 2 ¯rms in the market (the N > 2 restriction will become
apparent in the solution).
Let the total cost function be quadratic of the form: TC(Q) = k + aQ + 1
2bQ2.




Let the contract position of ¯rm i be QCi, where QCi are iid random variables with distribution
F(QC).
We are going to look for symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the game in linear supply
functions,of the form:
Si(p) = S(p;QCi) = ® + ¯p + °QCi
Given such supply functions, the probability that the market clearing price is below a given









QCj · (N ¡ 1)® + (N ¡ 1)¯p + Si(p)
Notice that the left-hand side of this equation collects together all of the random elements of
this problem, from the perspective of bidder i.
That is,
H(p;Si(p)) = PrfQtot ¡ °
X
j6=i
QCj · (N ¡ 1)® + (N ¡ 1)¯p + Si(p)g
where H(p;Si(p)) depends on the distribution of the random variable Zi = Qtot¡°
P
j6=i QCj.
Recall, however, the ¯rst-order condition for optimality derived in the paper:













This \simpli¯cation" does not depend on the distribution of QCi's. It holds for any (non-atomic)
distribution with full support over the range of prices.
How does this help? Plugging in for MC(Q) = a + bQ :




¯(N ¡ 1)p ¡ ¯(N ¡ 1)a + QCi = Si(p)[1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)b]
Now, use the expression: Si(p) = ® + ¯p + °QCi
¯(N ¡ 1)p ¡ ¯(N ¡ 1)a + QCi = (® + ¯p + °QCi)[1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)b]
For this equality to hold, we need to have the conditions (equating coe±cients on like terms):
¯(N ¡ 1)
1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)b
= ¯
¡¯(N ¡ 1)a
1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)b
= ®
1
1 + ¯(N ¡ 1)b
= °
The ¯rst equation has two solutions, ¯ = 0 and ¯ = N¡2
(N¡1)b. We focus on the second solution,
since ¯ = 0 yields the bidding strategy, Si(p) = QCi , which can actually be equilibrium bidding
strategies, since the residual demand curve seen by every bidder is vertical.



























b) , and steeper ( N¡2
(N¡1)b < 1
b, but we are looking at slope when quantity is on the
horizontal axis).
Notes:
1. When N = 2, the only equilibrium candidate that survives is Si(p) = QCi.
2. If the market demand function, Qtot(p) is not perfectly inelastic, then the "trivial" equilibrium
Si(p) = QCi does not survive, since the residual demand function faced by each ¯rm is no
longer vertical.
3. What if ¯rms were asymmetric, i.e. MCi(Q) = ai+biQ? In this case, we look for asymmetric
equilibria of the form: Si(p;QCi) = ®i + ¯ip + °iQCi, and get a system of 3N equations to

































j6=i ¯j = ¯i can be solved numerically for ¯i as a
function of b1;:::;bN (we have not been able to ¯nd an analytic solution). Given ¯i, one can then
solve for ®i and °i.
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City of San Antonio Public Service 8
Central Power & Light 7
City of Austin 6
Calpine 5
Lower Colorado River Authority 4
Lamar Power Partners 4
Guadalupe Power Partners 2
West Texas Utilities 2
Midlothian Energy 2
Dow Chemical 1
Brazos Electric Power Cooperative 1
Others 16
Table 2: Volume of Sales into Balancing Market
Firm Average Sales (MWh)
Reliant 431
TXU 133
Extex Laporte LP 116
Calpine Corp 102
Tenaska Gateway Partners 72
City of San Antonio Public Service 49
City of Austin 48
Central Power & Light 35
Cogen Lyondell Inc 34
City of Bryan 30
Lamar Power Partners 30
Lower Colorado River Authority 28
Ingleside Cogeneration 25
BP Energy 17
Brownsville Public Utility Board 17
Tractebel Power 15
Midlothian Energy 15
Gregory Power Partners 14
Guadalupe Power Partners 12
West Texas Utilities 11
Note: Sales implied by bidstack and total balancing demand.
44Table 3: Outcomes Under Actual, Ex-Post Optimal and Naive Best Response Bidding
Upper
Percent Achieved Producer Surplus Quantity Sales Bound
Relative To ($/hour) (MWh) Total
Firm XP Optimal Naive BR Actual Naive BR XP Optimal XP Optimal Actual Prof
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reliant 79% 80% 3,422 4,268 4,333 507 431 98%
Brownsville PUB 50% 50% 173 343 343 42 17 88%
City of Bryan 45% 45% 221 488 488 56 30 85%
Tenaska Gateway Partners 41% 41% 456 1,111 1,115 182 72 88%
TXU 39% 41% 1,243 3,056 3,159 441 133 97%
Calpine Corp 37% 38% 820 2,168 2,214 408 102 91%
Denton Municipal Electric 35% 35% 11 31 31 3 1 98%
Ingleside Cogeneration 31% 31% 171 541 541 81 25 79%
City of Austin 30% 31% 581 1,889 1,907 271 48 84%
Rio Nogales LP 28% 28% 109 393 393 60 10 93%
Lower Colorado River Auth 25% 25% 367 1,471 1,488 274 28 88%
City of San Antonio 23% 24% 290 1,221 1,241 266 49 90%
Gregory Power Partners 20% 20% 143 720 722 96 14 82%
Midlothian Energy 17% 17% 171 1,016 1,024 175 15 86%
Cogen Lyondell Inc 16% 16% 408 2,523 2,523 269 34 67%
Tractebel Power Inc 16% 16% 127 795 795 97 15 79%
Brazos Electric Power Coop 15% 15% 101 676 677 82 6 79%
Lamar Power Partners 15% 15% 266 1,800 1,808 272 30 79%
Mirant Wichita Falls 14% 14% 16 114 114 18 2 83%
BP Energy 14% 14% 134 993 994 135 17 80%
City of Garland 13% 13% 128 1,018 1,019 115 5 80%
Hays Energy 8% 8% 64 775 777 111 8 82%
West Texas Utilities 8% 8% 132 1,635 1,635 224 11 82%
Central Power & Light 8% 8% 185 2,375 2,407 352 35 80%
Guadalupe Power Partners 6% 6% 140 2,356 2,380 396 12 77%
Tenaska Frontier Partners 5% 5% 52 1,044 1,051 144 7 80%
South Texas Electric Coop 3% 3% 8 298 298 44 1 81%
Sweeney Cogeneration 2% 2% 10 409 409 46 2 85%
Brazos Valley Energy LP 0% 0% 1 134 134 12 0 68%
AES Deepwater 0% 0% 1 969 969 92 0 60%
Frontera General LP 0% 0% 0 984 1,004 197 0 62%
TGC 0% 0% 0 405 405 70 0 81%
South Houston Green Power 0% 0% 0 60 60 7 0 70%
Air Liquide America -8% -8% -181 2,174 2,176 103 9 55%
Extex Laporte LP -81% -81% -1,230 1,497 1,497 92 116 41%
Producer surplus measures are all relative to pro¯tability under not bidding into the balancing market and are measured in
average dollars for each 6-7pm.
Percent Achieved is the ratio of producer surplus under actual bidding to producer surplus under the benchmark for optimal
bidding (either ex-post optimal or Naive Best Response).
Actual is the actual bids submitted by the ¯rms.
XP Optimal is ex-post optimal bidding constructed as we describe in section 3.
Naive BR is the naive best-response bid to rivals' lagged bids as we describe in section 4.3.2.
Quantity of sales are total volumes and, therefore, may sum to more than the average net demand for balancing energy.
In column 8, the Upper Bound for Total Pro¯tability = (Percent Achieved XP Optimal¤%Sales in Balancing)+(100% ¤ %Sales
in Bilateral) as de¯ned in section 4.2.
45Table 4: J-Tests of Expected Pro¯t Maximization
Firm TJT P-value T Reject E[¼] max?
Reliant (pre-Nov 2002) 13.1 0.71 116 No
Reliant 33.4 0.99 154 Yes
Brownsville 24.27 0.99 53 Yes
Bryan 91.3 1 220 Yes
Tenaska 75.61 1 82 Yes
TXU 146.1 1 220 Yes
Calpine 115.3 1 171 Yes
Notes: Section 4.3.2, Equation (6) was used form the moments. Speci¯cally, the quantity derivative of the ¯rm's
pro¯t function was taken at 11 equally spaced prices between $16 and $36. Hansen's J-statistic, JT, is given by
Equation (7). The p-value is based on a Â
2 distribution with 11 degrees of freedom. The 5% critical value is 19.7.
Table 5: Characteristics of Bid Functions By Percent Achieved
Firm Percent Mean Mean Bid-Ask
Achieved Bid Points Spread ($/MWh)
Reliant 79% 22.2 $2.06
City of Bryan 45% 6.5 $22.58
TXU 39% 12.6 $20.60
Calpine Corp 37% 7.5 $12.55
City of Austin 30% 10.0 $25.92
Lower Colorado River Authority 25% 9.1 $25.98
City of Garland 13% 6.1 $20.32
South Texas Electric Coop 3% 3.7 $68.66
Notes: Percent Achieved is percent of possible producer surplus achieved under actual bidding relative to not bidding.
Bid-Ask Spread is price di®erence between ¯rst INC and ¯rst DEC bid at balancing quantity=0.
46Table 6: Relationship Between Pro¯tability and Transmission Congestion
Dependent Variable: Monthly PercentAchieved by Firm i
All Firms Own Bidders
Pct Intervals Congested -0.16 -0.17
(0.09) (0.14)
Volume Optimal Output (GWh) 0.34 0.09
(0.21) (0.25)
Monthly Fraction DEC -0.05 0.03
(0.06) (0.11)
R-squared 0.48 0.47
Model includes ¯rm ¯xed e®ects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: PercentAchieved is the monthly fraction of potential
pro¯ts achieved relative to not bidding, de¯ned in section 4.2.
47Table 7: Relationship Between Pro¯tability and Firm Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size (MWh) 0.00052 0.00047 0.00035 -0.00015 -0.00035





Merchant Firm -0.098 -0.167 -0.170
(0.135) (0.146) (0.098)*






Constant 0.100 0.158 0.200 0.158 0.262
(0.054)* (0.142) (0.152) (0.058)** (0.098)**
Observations 34 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.15 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.50
Notes: Dependent variable is the Percent Achieved for ¯rm i over the entire sample as de¯ned in section 4. Parameters
are estimated by OLS. White standard errors are in parentheses. The excluded category for ¯rm type is Investor-
Owned utililty.
* signi¯cant at 10%
** signi¯cant at 5%
*** signi¯cant at 1%
48Table 8: Evolution of Bid-Ask Spread Over Time
Top 6 Firms Non Top 6 Firms
Days Since Market Began -0.039 -0.000
(0.015)* (0.010)






Notes: Model includes ¯rm ¯xed e®ects. Dependent variable is the daily bid-ask spread, or di®erence in price between
¯rst INC and ¯rst DEC at q=0. Top 6 ¯rms are the six ¯rms with the largest PercentAchieved as reported in Table
3 { Reliant, Brownsville, City of Bryan, Tenaska Gateway Partners, TXU and Calpine. O®-peak season is October-
April. Parameters are estimated by OLS. White standard errors are in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 5%
** signi¯cant at 1%
Table 9: Evolution of Performance and Learning
All Firms Top 6 Firms Non Top 6 Firms
Days Since Market Began 0.00031 0.00033 0.00028
(0.00010)** (0.00029) (0.00009)**
Volume Optimal Output (GWh) 0.16 0.25 0.09
(0.06)** (0.10)* (0.06)
O®-Peak Season 0.01361 -0.04437 0.03164
(0.01892) (0.03799) (0.01885)
Constant 0.02330 0.21053 -0.01441
(0.03030) (0.07503)** (0.02886)
Observations 9765 2103 7662
R-squared 0.25 0.18 0.11
Notes: Model includes ¯rm ¯xed e®ects. The dependent variable is the PercentAchieved for ¯rm i on day t.
Parameters are estimated by OLS. White standard errors in parentheses.
* signi¯cant at 5%
** signi¯cant at 1%
49Table 10: Decomposition of E±ciency Losses from Observed Bidding Behavior
Bidding Counterfactual Average Production Cost
Actual Bids for all ¯rms $29,874
\Strategic" ¯rms Bid MC, Others Bid Actual $28,671
All Firms Bid MC (Vickrey auction) $23,571
Total E±ciency Losses $6,303
\Strategic Bidders" $1,203
\Non-Strategic Bidders" $5,100
\Strategic" ¯rms are Reliant, TXU, Calpine, Brownsville, Bryan and Tenaska Gateway Partners. The average
production cost is the hourly average of the absolute value of the cost of dispatch (either costs in INC hours or cost

















BFigure 2     
 
Example of Actual and Ex-Post Optimal Bidding 
 
 



































Bid Schedule Figure 3 
Sample Bidding InterfaceFigure 4 
Sample Bidder’s Operations InterfaceFigure 5 
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Density of Balancing Demand 
Mean = -24 
Stdev = 1068 
Min = -3700 
25
th Pctile  = -709
75
th Pctile = 615 
Max = 2713 
Sample is uncongested weekdays 6:00-6:15pm from September 2001 - January 2003. Figure 7:  Examples of Actual and Optimal Bid Functions 
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 Figure 7  (contd) 
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Guadalupe Power Partners 




































Performance vs. Stakes in Balancing Market 
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Percent Achieved is the percent of possible producer surplus achieved relative to not bidding, as 
defined in section 4.2 and reported in column 1 of Table 3.  Volume of optimal output is the mean 
of the absolute value of quantity sales under ex-post optimal bidding, as reported in column 6 of 
Table 3.  We restrict this analysis to firms that serve as their own bidding entities because we can 
best measure “stakes” of a bidding entity by focusing on firms that serve as their own bidders. 
 
 